GEOPOLITICA
What Ankara Can Offer in the Black Sea After the Erdogan–Zelensky Meeting, and What Romania Still Has to Pay
Drones have struck at least 12 commercial ships in the Black Sea over the past few weeks, and on 31 October, Erdogan and Zelensky agreed in Istanbul to relaunch the grain corridor.
The stake for Romania is concrete: container carriers have already introduced war-risk surcharges for Romanian ports, and the cost is passed on to importers, farmers and, ultimately, consumers. The thesis of this article is that, without an operational mechanism with security guarantees, the Istanbul agreement will not reduce either the attacks or the surcharges in the coming months. The dominant scenario, estimated at 35–50%, is a status quo of intermittent attacks and no agreement, with the caveat that a US–Russia understanding on a limited maritime truce would rapidly change the equation.
1. The mechanism: how attacks at sea reach prices in Romania
The chain begins with the intensity of the attacks. According to CNN, as cited by G4Media, at least 12 commercial vessels have been struck in recent weeks, with the declared aim, according to analysts, of blocking exports through Ukrainian ports. Tomas Alexa, principal analyst at Ambrey Analytics, a maritime security firm, estimated, according to Reuters, that the number of targeted vessels was more than four times higher than in the previous six months, when 74 vessels were targeted. The second link is geography.
Many of the vessels hit in October were anchored near a Romanian canal used by Ukraine for exports; one was in Romanian territorial waters, and the other eight in the exclusive economic zone of Romania or Bulgaria. On 23 October, another vessel was struck just outside Romanian territorial waters. The third link is the price of risk. The Japanese carrier Ocean Network Express has introduced war-risk surcharges on shipments involving Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia.
A counter-hypothesis deserves weighing: the surcharges may also reflect a commercial repositioning by shipowners, not only physical risk. The available data are not sufficient to separate the two effects, but the simultaneity with the wave of attacks suggests that risk is the main factor. Link by link, the mechanism is plausible, not quantitatively demonstrated.
2. What Ankara can offer: mediation, not escort
In Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that attacks on civilian vessels are unacceptable "regardless of who commits them", while Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, announced an agreement to work on the grain corridor, according to Reuters and AFP, as cited by Financial Intelligence. The same source notes that no details were presented about the mechanism, security guarantees or timetable.
Turkey's asset is its position as an interlocutor with both sides. Ankara has already presented Moscow and Kyiv with a proposal to halt attacks on commercial vessels, but neither party has acted on it. Erdogan's neutral wording should be read as preserving a channel with Moscow, not as a naval protection commitment.
Russia denies targeting neighbours of Ukraine and accuses European governments of escalation through military aid to Kyiv. Military analysts cited by Reuters have, however, few doubts about the perpetrator: Ambrey observed that the naval drone used in the latest attack resembled a Russian model.
Turkey's mediation capacity is real; the willingness to turn mediation into operational guarantees remains unclear.
3. Romania: economic and energy exposure, allied response
Sidharth Kaushal, senior research fellow at the British institute RUSI, described the most recent attack as "without doubt, an escalation". Iulia Joja, director of the Black Sea programme at the Middle East Institute in Washington, described the attacks as testing NATO's red lines, calculated on the West's reluctance to escalate.
NATO has announced maritime patrol aircraft, radars and drones on the eastern flank, and an alliance official recalled the commitment to invest over 40 billion dollars in counter-drone capabilities over the next five years. The specific budget for Romania's coastal defence is not stated in the sources.
The energy dimension raises the stakes. Neptun Deep, the offshore project in the Black Sea, is set to enter production, according to Ziarul Financiar. Romgaz, a partner in the project, has reassessed its risk profile and considers the security risks "low to medium".
On the diplomatic front, Prime Minister Luca Niculescu spoke of shared interests and responsibilities with Turkey in the Black Sea, and Defence Minister Ștefan Radu Oprea described the sea as "turbulent". These statements are diplomatic positioning, not measures with an associated budget. Pentagon Under Secretary Elbridge Colby was expected in Bucharest, according to CursDeGuvernare.
4. Scenarios and verifiable predictions
Dominant scenario (35–50%): status quo without agreement. Driver: Russia rejects any mechanism without concessions on sanctions. Constraint: Turkey remains at the level of declarations. Consequence: surcharges persist. Indicator: new attacks reported in the Romanian EEZ. Plausible scenario (25–40%): partially relaunched corridor, with Turkish guarantees. Driver: a limited maritime truce negotiated with the US. Constraint: lack of verification. Consequence: gradual decline in risk premiums at Constanța. Indicator: a document signed in Istanbul. Tail scenario (15–25%): escalation of incidents near Romanian waters, with pressure on the Naval Forces budget. Improbable scenario (under 10%): acceleration of an alternative Black Sea–Aegean route, a concept discussed by SpotMedia over the long term.
| Prediction | Horizon | Probability | How it is verified | Verification source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No written corridor mechanism with guarantees and a timetable is published | 31.12.2026 | 55–70% | Absence of a signed Turkey–Ukraine–Russia text | Turkish Presidency, Reuters |
| At least one new attack on a vessel in Romania's EEZ | 31.01.2027 | 50–65% | Official communiqué on the incident | MApN, NATO MARCOM |
| ONE war-risk surcharge for Romania remains in force | 28.02.2027 | 55–70% | Carrier's tariff notice | Ocean Network Express website |
| Romgaz does not report a security incident at Neptun Deep | 31.03.2027 | 75–90% | Current reports to investors | BVB |
Method, definitions and figures
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the maritime area of up to 200 nautical miles in which the coastal state has economic rights but not full sovereignty; territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles. The figure of 12 vessels struck comes from CNN and covers "recent weeks", without an exact interval. The Ambrey figures (74 vessels in the previous half-year, a multiple of more than four) are private estimates, not an official series.
No derived figures have been calculated. The surcharges have no published value in the sources consulted, so their effect on prices cannot be estimated.
The probabilities in the scenarios and in the table are editorial estimates expressed as intervals of at least 10 percentage points; they are not statistically calibrated against a track record of forecasts and should be read as ordered judgements, not as frequencies. The CNN, Ambrey and NATO figures are not comparable with one another, as they have different scopes and methods.
Limits of the analysis
The analysis cannot establish the size of the surcharges or how they pass through into consumer prices, because the sources do not quantify them. The attribution of the attacks rests on assessments by analysts and a private firm, not on an official conclusion of an investigation. The diagnosis would be invalidated by an officially announced maritime truce with international verification. Reassessment is needed after any document signed in Istanbul or after the first new incident in Romanian waters, and in any case before 31 December 2026.
