“The first and most important lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy can do—and it is a lesson of the most profound importance—is that monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source of economic disturbance.”Milton Friedman · The Role of Monetary Policy · 1968 · Milton Friedman, «The Role of Monetary Policy», American Economic Review, vol. 58, nr. 1, martie 1968 (discursul prezidențial AEA din decembrie 1967), p. 12 (redarea română: traducerea noastră)
The Taylor rule does not say what the central bank will do, but how far its policy stands from a simple benchmark.
In 1993 John Taylor published ‘Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice’ in the Carnegie-Rochester series, with a simple rule that described the Federal Reserve’s interest rate for 1987–1992 fairly well: i = π + 0.5·y + 0.5·(π − 2) + 2. Here i is the nominal policy rate, π is inflation over the previous four quarters, y is the output gap in percent, and the two at the end are the inflation target and the neutral real rate. It is not the law by which central banks decide but a benchmark. The mechanism lies in the inflation coefficient: π enters once directly and 0.5 times in the gap from the target, so for every extra point of inflation the rate rises by 1.5 points and the real rate goes up (the Taylor principle). When the rule is violated, the real rate falls as inflation rises, as in the 1970s according to some estimates. In July 2022, with euro-area inflation at 8.6% in June, the ECB raised its deposit rate from −0.50% to 0.00%; it reached 4.00% only in September 2023. The effect is transmitted through credit, asset prices, the exchange rate and expectations, with Friedman’s ‘long and variable’ lags. The main limit is that the neutral rate cannot be observed: it is estimated, and the estimates fell after 2008 and were revised after 2022. The output gap is revised too, sometimes by whole points. For a forecaster, the rule is a plausibility band: if the central bank stays far below it, the useful question is what the bank knows or fears, not whether the rule is wrong.
Worked example: the Taylor rule with round numbers, then a real case. The formula: i = π + 0.5·y + 0.5·(π − 2) + 2, with π inflation, y the output gap in percent, the target 2% and the neutral real rate 2%.
Case π y calculation i
A on target 2 0 2 + 0 + 0 + 2 4.0%
B inflation 4, gap -1 4 -1 4 − 0.5 + 1.0 + 2 6.5%
C inflation 6, gap -1 6 -1 6 − 0.5 + 2.0 + 2 9.5%
D as B, neutral rate 1 4 -1 4 − 0.5 + 1.0 + 1 5.5%From B to C inflation rises by 2 points and the indicated rate by 3 (1.5 × 2). The real rate (i − π) goes from 6.5 − 4 = 2.5 to 9.5 − 6 = 3.5: it rises by one point. Case D shows how much the result hangs on an unobservable number: if the neutral rate is 1% and not 2%, the same economy calls for 1 point less.
The real case. In June 2022 the euro-area annual inflation rate was 8.6%. With a zero output gap and the same formula: i = 8.6 + 0 + 0.5 × (8.6 − 2) + 2 = 8.6 + 3.3 + 2 = 13.9%. On 21 July 2022 the ECB decided on a deposit rate of 0.00%, almost 14 points below the benchmark. The rule overstated, of course: inflation at the time was largely energy, and part of it was temporary; on core inflation, much lower, the calculation gives a much smaller result. Still, when policy stands this far from the rule, the direction of the next meetings can be forecast: the ECB went from 0.00% to 4.00% in 14 months. The rule did not predict the level, but the direction and the pressure.
For the forecaster: base rate and signals. The base rate for a central bank’s decisions is built by counting meetings: for the last 100 monetary-policy meetings of the chosen bank, the share with a rate change against those with a hold. Most meetings are holds as a rule, and central banks prepare the market before a move; that is why the best conditional base rate is the rate path implied by market prices, not the historical average.
Indicators to watch: HICP and core inflation (Eurostat); the quarterly macroeconomic projections of ECB staff and the statements after meetings (ECB); the curve of rates implied by €STR contracts, that is, what the market expects (published by the ECB and by market data providers); output-gap estimates (IMF, European Commission, CBO for the United States).
The trap: the Taylor rule gives a range, not a number. The choice of inflation (headline or core), of the neutral rate and of the gap can move the result by 3–5 points; whoever uses it as a point forecast picks the result after seeing the decision. A second trap: confusing ‘should’ with ‘will’: a central bank reacts to its own projection, not to the formula.
A scorable question (illustrative): ‘Will the ECB deposit facility rate, after the last monetary-policy meeting of the first half of 2027, be below 2.00%?’ Resolution source: the ECB page on key interest rates and the statement of that meeting; if the ECB changes its key instrument, use the rate at which it remunerates overnight deposits.
Why it matters In mid-2022 the Taylor rule, fed with the inflation of the day, pointed to rates of the order of 14% while the ECB’s rate was 0%; the gap foreshadowed the steepest hiking cycle in the euro’s history.