Author
Cynthia M. Grabo (Joint Military Intelligence College)
1 reading card from 1 book · 2002.
1 card
Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning · 2002
The indicator is what you expect to see; the indication is what you actually see.
Grabo wrote the text in the early 1970s as a classified textbook for warning analysts, drawing on some twenty-five years of experience. The US Defense Intelligence Agency published it in three classified volumes between 1972 and 1974, and the Joint Military Intelligence College later published the declassified, condensed version. Her starting distinction is the one non-specialists most often miss: an indicator is a known or theoretical step the adversary should or may take in preparing for hostilities — something anticipated and put on a watch list. An indication is information that the step is actually being taken. The method works in three moves: build the indicator list in advance for the scenario that worries you (a call-up of reservists, a deployment of forces, a military alert), track what gets ticked off, and judge the pattern rather than isolated pieces. The warning judgement concerns the probability of action, not its imminence, and it can come weeks or months ahead. It pays off wherever surprise is very costly and the adversary's preparations leave traces. The trap is treating warning as a commodity you either have or lack. It is a hypothesis, so it has to be issued before certainty arrives.
“Warning is an intangible, an abstraction, a theory, a deduction, a perception, a belief. It is the product of reasoning or of logic, a hypothesis whose validity can be neither confirmed nor refuted until it is too late.”