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Lesson 22 · The warehouse is the biggest target in the company because it gathers everything; the defence is least privilege, applied to rows and columns, with audit.

Jerome Saltzer, Michael Schroeder · The Protection of Information in Computer Systems · 1975 · The Protection of Information in Computer Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE 63(9), 1975 — §I.A.3, principiul (f), least privilege2 minutes read
“Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.”Jerome Saltzer, Michael Schroeder · The Protection of Information in Computer Systems · 1975 · The Protection of Information in Computer Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE 63(9), 1975 — §I.A.3, principiul (f), least privilege

Any privilege you cannot justify by a task is one to remove.

A source system exposes one customer; the warehouse exposes all of them, with history. That is why the 1975 principle is more concrete here than anywhere. Least privilege applies on three axes: tables (a role sees only the schemas it needs), columns (dynamic masking: the analyst sees the last four digits, accounting sees everything) and rows (row-level security: a sales agent sees only their region, through the same view, without copies of the table). Access to the identity vault from lesson 18 is a separate role, granted separately. Underneath, two layers that are not negotiable: encryption at rest, with keys managed outside the warehouse and rotated, and encryption in transit. On top, audit: every query on sensitive tables is recorded — who, when, what was read, how many rows — retained and, above all, read by someone. The usual traps are mundane, which is why they are common: a service account for the BI tool with rights over the whole warehouse, used by everyone; secrets pasted into SQL; shared accounts that make the audit useless. Saltzer and Schroeder's rule, read backwards: any privilege you cannot justify by a task is one to remove.

The card covers the three axes: tables, columns, rows. The next step is time. A privilege can be minimal at one hour and excessive at another. That is why broad access to the warehouse should be temporary: you raise your rights for a short window, do the work, then they expire on their own. Everyday example: nobody keeps the cash register key all day; you ask for it at payment and hand it right back. Likewise, an engineer requests read access to the salary table only for Tuesday's debugging session. The permanent broad account becomes the exception, not the rule. This gives audit real meaning: the log shows not just who read what, but why they were entitled to at that moment. But temporariness raises a new question: who is allowed to grant these access windows?

Passage 1 ended with a question: who grants the access windows? The 1975 answer is separation of duties. The person requesting access should not be the one approving it, and the approver should not be the one reviewing it later. In a small company this sounds excessive, yet it works simply: the developer requests, the team lead approves, and the audit report goes monthly to security. Three different eyes, not one. Everyday example: at a bank, the person opening the vault is not the one counting the money. Likewise, in the warehouse of data, a service account should not be able to widen its own rights. If one person requests, grants and reviews, least privilege becomes a form signed by himself. But approval is only half the mechanism — what happens when someone still abuses the access they received?

Why it matters A single over-privileged service account turns a breach in a reporting tool into a leak of the company's entire history.

Encryption at restand in transitLeast privilege:tables, columns,Audit that someonereads
The foundation is encryption; the apex is someone reading the log.
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