olivLaw · European equity research
Universal Music Group N.V. UMG.AS
Netherlands · Euronext Amsterdam · ISIN NL0015000IY2 · Vertical: Listed companies from Netherlands
Universal Music Group is one of the world's largest music companies, active in recorded music, music publishing and direct relationships with fans. The company is now focusing on the superfan segment and the 'Streaming 2.0' model, which could generate additional revenue if these strategies take hold.
At the close of 05 Nov 2026, Universal Music Group N.V. (UMG.AS) stock was 17.78 EUR (+1.14% on the day), with market capitalisation 32.4 bn EUR, P/E 21.4 on diluted EPS of 0.83 EUR over the last 12 months, beta 0.34, 52-week range 14.02–22.91 EUR.
Data as of · AI analysis dated · Source: ESEF annual reports and closing prices, computed by olivLaw.
Price history
Loading chart…
Technical reading
- RSI (14)
- 72.2
- overbought (≥ 70)
- Bollinger (20, 2)
- 14.57 – 17.73
- above the upper band · %B 1.02 · band width 19.6%
- SMA 50 / 200
- 15.14 / 17.54
- mixed trend
- MACD (12, 26, 9)
- 0.63 / 0.47
- MACD above signal
Indicators describe past prices; on their own they do not predict direction. On our history the RSI ≤ 40 filter added no return (see the signals methodology).
Performance
| Company | EURO STOXX 50 | vs EURO STOXX 50 | Vertical median | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 month | +24.4% | −0.6% | +25.1 pp | — |
| 3 months | +17.3% | −4.2% | +21.5 pp | — |
| 6 months | −8.8% | +4.3% | −13.1 pp | — |
| Year to date | −20.0% | +7.5% | −27.5 pp | — |
| 1 year | −21.6% | +9.9% | −31.5 pp | −0.2% |
| 3 years | −24.0% | +49.8% | −73.8 pp | +2.2% |
| 5 years | −31.5% | +42.8% | −74.4 pp | — |
Price returns, dividends excluded.
Quarterly results
ESEF annual reports carry no quarters: the results are annual (below).
E/P over time
E/P = trailing-12-month diluted EPS / price at quarter end. E/P is the inverse of P/E and stays defined when earnings are negative.
Today's P/E sits at the 0 percentile of its own 3-quarter history (min 21.9, median 26.8, max 38.0; quarters with earnings only).
Fiscal years
| Fiscal year | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 11.1 bn | 11.8 bn | 12.5 bn |
| Revenue YoY | unavailable | +6.5% | +5.7% |
| Net income | 1.3 bn | 2.1 bn | 1.5 bn |
| Net income YoY | unavailable | +65.7% | −26.5% |
| Diluted EPS | 0.68 | 1.13 | 0.83 |
| Diluted EPS YoY | unavailable | +66.2% | −26.5% |
| net % | 11.3% | 17.6% | 12.3% |
| Free cash flow | 1.8 bn | 1.7 bn | 1.7 bn |
Balance sheet & financial health
Fiscal year 2025 · 31 Dec 2025
- Cash
- 451.0 m EUR
- Financial debt
- 2.3 bn EUR
- Net debt
- 1.8 bn EUR
- Equity
- 4.6 bn EUR
- Total assets
- 17.5 bn EUR
- Debt / equity
- 0.50x
- Current ratio
- 0.63x
- ROE
- 33.6%
- ROA
- 8.8%
- FCF margin
- 13.3%
Financial statements (source on every figure)
Revenue and net income (EUR)
Margins
Income statement · EUR
| Line | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Source (latest year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 11.1 bn | 11.8 bn | 12.5 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Cost of revenue | 6.2 bn | 6.7 bn | 7.2 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Gross profit | 4.9 bn ≈ | 5.1 bn ≈ | 5.3 bn ≈ | esef· 07 Apr 2026derived |
| Operating income | 1.4 bn | 1.8 bn | 2.0 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Interest expense | 151.0 m | 187.0 m | 233.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Pre-tax income | 1.7 bn | 2.9 bn | 2.1 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Income tax | 458.0 m | 778.0 m | 546.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Net income | 1.3 bn | 2.1 bn | 1.5 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Diluted EPS | 0.68 | 1.13 | 0.83 | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
≈ computed by olivLaw from the reported lines of the same year: Revenue − Cost of revenue.
Balance sheet · EUR
| Line | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Source (latest year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | 413.0 m | 553.0 m | 451.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Inventories | 210.0 m | 255.0 m | 263.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Current assets | 4.1 bn | 4.6 bn | 4.6 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Property, plant & equipment, net | 177.0 m | 242.0 m | 255.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Goodwill | 1.6 bn | 1.9 bn | 1.8 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Total assets | 13.1 bn | 17.3 bn | 17.5 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Long-term debt | 1.8 bn | 1.8 bn | 2.3 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Current liabilities | 6.3 bn | 7.6 bn | 7.2 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Total liabilities | 10.1 bn | 12.8 bn | 12.9 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Equity | 3.0 bn | 4.6 bn | 4.6 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Shares outstanding at year end | 1.8 bn | 1.8 bn | 1.8 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026derived |
Cash flow · EUR
| Line | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Source (latest year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 1.9 bn | 1.8 bn | 1.7 bn | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Capex | 47.0 m | 91.0 m | 70.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Free cash flow | 1.8 bn ≈ | 1.7 bn ≈ | 1.7 bn ≈ | esef· 07 Apr 2026derived |
| Investing cash flow | -622.0 m | -1.1 bn | -854.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
| Financing cash flow | -1.3 bn | -552.0 m | -988.0 m | esef· 07 Apr 2026verified |
≈ computed by olivLaw from the reported lines of the same year: Operating cash flow − Capex.
Computed indicators
Growth
Profitability
Returns
Balance sheet
Liquidity
Cash
Efficiency
Market and valuation
1 indicators that do not apply to the sector.
Valuation
olivLaw classification
- score weight coverage: 52.1% of at least 60%
A scoring methodology on indicators and valuation, not investment advice.
Closing price
05 Nov 2026Source: olivLaw, closing series
Market cap: 32.4 bn EUR
Key indicators
Coverage and freshness
Score by group
52% · Insufficient data
Estimated value range
The combined range = the median of the valid methods' low, central and high values; it is not a probability interval and does not cover every result. Envelope of all methods: 8.76 – 22.51 EUR.
Valuation assumptions are editorial choices, not measured; beta is not measured.
Method ranges (EUR per share)
— — Mid · ▏ Price
Valuation methods
- DCF (discounted cash flow)13.79 – 22.51 (Mid 17.10)WACC 8.2% · starting FCFF 1.8 bn EUR · terminal value share of EV 75%The WACC × g sensitivity gives the method's bounds; these are not probabilities.Reverse DCF: starting growth implied by the price (fading linearly to terminal growth, everything else fixed): 7.3%
- Peers: EV/EBITDAunavailable · input data missing
- Peers: P/E8.76 – 21.30 (Mid 12.04)16 companies used · median multiple 14.5x · quartiles 10.6x – 25.7xAALB.AS, ACOMO.AS, AD.AS, ADYEN.AS, AKZA.AS, ARCAD.AS, ASM.AS, ASML.AS, AXS.AS, BAMNB.AS, BNJ.AS, CRBN.AS, CTAC.AS, ECMPA.AS, FFARM.AS, HAL.AS
- Dividend discount (DDM)unavailable · the company pays no dividend: a dividend model needs an explicit initiation assumption
Assumptions (illustrative, editorial)
- Risk-free rate
- 3.0%
- Equity risk premium
- 5.5%
- Beta (default)
- 1.00
- Cost of equity
- 8.5%
- Terminal growth
- 2.0%
Factor scorecard
Insufficient data
Minimum-evidence gate: score weight coverage: 52.1% of at least 60%
| Factor | Value | Score | Weight used |
|---|---|---|---|
| ROIC · Quality | 24.2% | 92 (vs peers) | 20% |
| Net margin · Quality | 12.3% | 78 (vs peers) | 12% |
| FCF conversion · Quality | 108.9% | 100 (on a fixed band) | 12% |
| Revenue CAGR 3Y · Growth | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| EPS CAGR 3Y · Growth | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| Net debt / EBITDA · Balance sheet | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| Interest coverage · Balance sheet | 8.6x | 100 (on a fixed band) | 12% |
| Current ratio · Balance sheet | 0.6x | 0 (on a fixed band) | 8% |
| P/E (TTM) · Valuation | 21.4x | 48 (vs peers) | 20% |
| EV/EBITDA · Valuation | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| FCF yield · Valuation | 5.1% | 64 (on a fixed band) | 16% |
| Shareholder yield (distributions) · Returns | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| Payout ratio (FCF) · Returns | unavailable | unavailable | — |
Factors without a value were dropped; the remaining weights were renormalised.
Score groups
- Balance sheet60/100 · 2/3 factors with a value
- Growth· partialunavailable · 0/2 factors with a value
- Quality90/100 · 3/3 factors with a value
- Returns· partialunavailable · 0/2 factors with a value
- Valuation55/100 · 2/3 factors with a value
A «partial» group is computed from under half of its weight or from one factor: it is not a full assessment of the group.
Memo
Universal Music Group N.V. (UMG.AS). Latest full fiscal year: 2025; data up to 2025-12-31.
Figures computed from the financial statements: revenue 12.5 bn EUR in 2025; YoY growth 5.7%; net margin 12.3%; ROE 33.8%.
The estimated value range is 11.27–21.91 EUR per share (median of 2 methods, agreement: high); assumptions are illustrative. Against the central value of 14.57 EUR, the price of 17.78 EUR leaves a potential of -18.1% (value / price − 1) and a margin of safety of -22.0% (1 − price / value). The range is the median of the methods' low, central and high values, not a probability interval.
Insufficient data for a verdict (score weight coverage: 52.1% of at least 60%).
Text generated deterministically from the figures shown; no language model. Not investment advice.
What supports the thesis
- ROIC: 24.2%
- Net margin: 12.3%
- FCF conversion: 108.9%
- Interest coverage: 8.6x
What contradicts it
- Current ratio: 0.6x
Not assessed (insufficient data or a ratio without meaning): Revenue CAGR 3Y, EPS CAGR 3Y, Net debt / EBITDA, EV/EBITDA, Shareholder yield (distributions), Payout ratio (FCF).
Versus the vertical median
Listed companies from Netherlands · same country · compared with 39 companies
Multiples and returns vs the median
Price rebased to 100 (monthly, 5 years)
Companies in the vertical
| Market cap | P/E | ROE | Net margin | Revenue YoY | 1A / 3A | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASML.ASASML Holding N.V. | 485.6 bn | 47.6 | 44.2% | 31.3% | +15.6% | +38% / +101% |
| DSFIR.ASDSM-Firmenich AG | 33.7 bn | 120.5 | 1.2% | 2.2% | +20.4% | +60% / +30% |
| UMG.ASUniversal Music Group N.V. | 32.4 bn | 21.4 | 33.8% | 12.3% | +5.7% | −19% / −27% |
| AD.ASKoninklijke Ahold Delhaize N.V. | 31.2 bn | 13.9 | 15.3% | 2.5% | +3.4% | −3% / +30% |
| ASM.ASASM International N.V. | 31.2 bn | 43.3 | 18.7% | 22.8% | +8.2% | +34% / +35% |
| ADYEN.ASAdyen N.V. | 28.1 bn | 26.6 | 22.3% | 40.1% | +18.9% | −33% / −17% |
| HAL.ASHAL Trust | 15.5 bn | 9.7 | 10.5% | 12.8% | +1.2% | +22% / +47% |
| EXO.ASExor N.V. | 15.0 bn | — | -10.6% | — | −100.0% | +1% / −18% |
| BESI.ASBE Semiconductor Industries N.V. | 11.2 bn | 84.9 | 28.7% | 22.3% | −2.7% | +8% / +10% |
| AKZA.ASAkzo Nobel N.V. | 10.7 bn | 17.0 | 13.8% | 6.3% | −5.2% | +12% / −11% |
| AALB.ASAalberts N.V. | 4.5 bn | 25.4 | 7.2% | 5.7% | −5.3% | +48% / +13% |
| ARCAD.ASArcadis N.V. | 4.2 bn | 20.2 | 18.3% | 4.3% | −2.4% | +24% / +2% |
| BNJ.ASBanijay Group N.V. | 3.4 bn | 13.8 | 343.8% | 5.1% | +1.6% | −11% / −8% |
| BAMNB.ASKoninklijke BAM Groep N.V. | 3.3 bn | 41.8 | 9.1% | 1.3% | +2.9% | +47% / +400% |
| BFIT.ASBasic-Fit N.V. | 2.0 bn | 138.2 | 3.6% | 1.0% | +16.9% | +7% / +16% |
| CRBN.ASCorbion N.V. | 1.6 bn | 8.3 | 27.3% | 14.9% | +1.9% | +40% / +55% |
| ECMPA.ASEurocommercial Properties N.V. | 1.4 bn | 11.2 | 5.9% | 45.4% | +4.2% | −4% / +19% |
| FUR.ASFugro N.V. | 985.3 m | — | -1.5% | -1.1% | −18.8% | −0% / −49% |
| ACOMO.ASAcomo N.V. | 685.9 m | 15.2 | 10.7% | 3.3% | +7.6% | −3% / +37% |
| FAST.ASFastned B.V. | 663.0 m | — | -28.2% | -21.7% | +66.1% | +60% / +25% |
| FFARM.ASForFarmers N.V. | 479.4 m | 9.6 | 14.5% | 1.6% | +14.8% | +22% / +123% |
| BRNL.ASBrunel International N.V. | 383.2 m | 125.5 | 1.0% | 0.3% | −10.8% | −6% / −29% |
| ENVI.ASEnvipco Holding N.V. | 224.1 m | — | -12.7% | -11.9% | −20.8% | −25% / +47% |
| ALFEN.ASAlfen N.V. | 219.8 m | — | -0.1% | -0.0% | −10.7% | −4% / −78% |
| CMCOM.ASCM.com N.V. | 192.5 m | — | -22.2% | -1.5% | −5.4% | +23% / −30% |
1- and 3-year price returns: for UMG.AS from daily closes (the same as the performance table), for the other companies from month-end closes.
olivLaw engine forecast
The world engine ran after the company's latest material disclosure. Probabilities are of TOUCHING a level within the horizon (not closing there) and sit next to the random walk (p_rw), the no-information benchmark.
The engine has no published run for this company yet.
Valuation scenarios (editable assumptions)
Illustrative scenarios
Illustrative: not forecasts and without probabilities. Each case is one coherent set of assumptions, computed on today's figures.
Estimated price (EUR)
| Estimated price | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 years | 10.76 Total return -39% · Per year -39% | 19.02 Total return 7% · Per year 7% | 28.63 Total return 61% · Per year 61% |
| 3 years | 10.70 Total return -40% · Per year -16% | 21.24 Total return 19% · Per year 6% | 35.08 Total return 97% · Per year 25% |
| 5 years | 10.63 Total return -40% · Per year -10% | 23.73 Total return 33% · Per year 6% | 42.98 Total return 142% · Per year 19% |
- Exit P/E± 5.31
- Net margin± 3.72
- Annual revenue growth± 3.02
- Annual dilution± 0.31
AI analysis
AI-generatedAI-generated analysis (Claude) from cited public sources; it may contain errors. Not investment advice. As of 27 Oct 2026 · Model: claude-haiku-5-5.
In brief
Universal Music Group is one of the world's largest music companies, active in recorded music, music publishing and direct relationships with fans. The company is now focusing on the superfan segment and the 'Streaming 2.0' model, which could generate additional revenue if these strategies take hold.
SWOT
Strengths
- Extensive artist and catalogue portfolio, plus a proprietary fan base that exceeds 200 million people 1.
- Proprietary eCommerce infrastructure that supports a large number of artist online stores 1.
- Leadership role in industry discussions on streaming and artificial intelligence, backed by agreements with major platforms 1.
Weaknesses
- Reliance on streaming, which remains the main revenue engine, can expose the company to changes in rates and contract terms.
- New activities such as physical spaces and media acquisitions require investment and may have uncertain returns during launch.
- Implementing the Artist-Centric model depends on each platform's decision, which limits the company's control over outcomes.
Opportunities
- Developing products for superfans, including collectibles and experiences, could raise revenue per fan 1.
- AI licensing could open new revenue sources if licensed platforms reach a broad public 1.
- Expansion in China through labels and local partnerships could open new markets for international and local artists 1.
Threats
- AI-generated content and streaming fraud can dilute catalogue value and reduce artist revenue.
- Regulation of copyright and AI may evolve in ways that restrict or complicate licensing models.
- Platforms that build their own premium products could reduce the bargaining power of music companies.
Risks
- Dependence on streaming platformshigh
Revenue largely depends on agreements with a few large platforms. Changes to contract terms could directly affect margins.
- Copyright litigation over AIhigh
Unlicensed use of music to train AI models can lead to litigation and costs, and resolutions may take a long time.
- Fraud and low-quality contentmedium
Streaming fraud and high volumes of weak content can reduce payments to artists and to the company.
- Execution of new activitiesmedium
Physical stores, media acquisitions and commerce platforms require capital and careful management, and outcomes are still uncertain.
- Dependence on international marketslow
Expansion in China and other regions exposes the company to local regulation and political or economic change.
Investment thesis
What would need to be true (bull case)
- If the Streaming 2.0 model takes hold, revenue per user could rise, and the company would have an advantage in negotiations with platforms.
- A large fan base and eCommerce infrastructure could support revenue growth from products and experiences beyond streaming.
- AI licensing agreements could turn a threat into a new revenue source if remuneration standards consolidate.
What would break the thesis
- If platforms do not adopt Artist-Centric principles, revenue growth could remain limited and pricing pressure could continue.
- Litigation and AI regulation could generate unforeseen costs and delay new revenue sources.
- New lifestyle and media activities could deliver weaker returns than the core business, diluting the focus of the strategy.
What to watch
- Trend in superfan and direct-commerce revenuenext 10-K
- Implementation of premium tiers with Spotify and YouTube2027
- Launch of the licensed AI platform with Udio2026
- Adoption of Artist-Centric principles by platforms2027
Products, market & competition
AI-generatedAI-generated analysis (Claude) from cited public sources; it may contain errors. Not investment advice. As of 27 Oct 2026 · Model: claude-haiku-5-5.
The business
Universal Music Group N.V. develops, produces and distributes music globally, through labels, music publishing and artist services. According to the 2025 annual report 1, the company is expanding beyond streaming through direct-to-consumer commerce, collectibles and experiences, as well as physical spaces under UMusic Hospitality & Lifestyle. The strategy aims to capture value from the relationship between artists and their most devoted fans.
A central element of the strategy is its proprietary eCommerce platform, which supports artist online stores and direct sales to the public. The company states the platform supports more than 1600 stores 1, and its owned fan audience exceeds 200 million people 1. These assets are presented as a source of growth complementary to streaming.
In 2025 the company also entered lifestyle activities, with UMusic shops in Madrid, New York and London, plus a store in Tokyo 1. The investment in the NTWRK platform and the acquisition of Complex point to expansion into commerce and digital media linked to fan culture 1.
Segments
Recorded music and streaming
This segment brings together the release and distribution of music on streaming platforms. The company describes multi-year agreements with Spotify and YouTube that include new premium subscription tiers and bundles of music and non-music content 1.
Superfans and direct commerce
The segment targets revenue from premium products, collectibles, merchandise and digital experiences. Superfans spend more than average listeners, according to data cited by the company 1, making this area a priority for growth.
Music publishing and artificial intelligence
The company is developing AI licensing arrangements, including an agreement with Udio for a licensed music creation platform due to launch in 2026 1. This segment could become a new revenue source if platforms adopt the licensing framework.
Market context
The global music market relies largely on streaming subscriptions, advertising and returns to artists and copyright holders. The company argues the market is moving from 'Streaming 1.0', focused on volume, to 'Streaming 2.0', focused on customer value and premium tiers 1. According to the report, growth in subscriptions and ad-funded streaming remains an important engine 1.
The market is shaped by oversupply of content, streaming fraud and generative technologies, which the company describes as risks to the industry's economic structure 1. Licensing agreements and principles on AI-generated music suggest the market is seeking common rules 1.
Trends
- Streaming 2.0 and premium tierstailwind
Streaming companies could introduce premium subscriptions and bundles, which could raise revenue per user if the model takes hold 1. The company says these ideas are already included in its new contracts with Spotify and YouTube 1.
- Artist-centric modelmixed
Artist-Centric principles aim to reward real fan engagement rather than content volume. If platforms apply them broadly, artist revenue could rise, but implementation remains a decision for each platform 1.
- Artificial intelligencemixed
AI can create new revenue through licensing and creation tools, but unlicensed generative technology can dilute catalogue value and favour fraudulent content 1. The outcome depends on regulation and on agreements with partners.
- Direct-to-consumer commercetailwind
Developing online stores, collectibles and physical spaces could diversify revenue, but requires investment and careful execution beyond streaming 1.
Competitive position
The company operates in an industry where competition comes from other major record labels, streaming platforms and new digital players. The source does not give a full list of competitors, but emphasises that differentiation through direct relationships with superfans and tools for artists is an advantage the company pursues 1.
Streaming platforms such as Spotify and YouTube are at once partners and actors with their own interests in negotiating the economic model. Competitive pressure also comes from platforms building their own premium tiers and creation tools 1.
- Spotify
Partner under multi-year agreements and, at the same time, a streaming platform with its own interests in the premium model.
- YouTube
Platform with which the company signed new agreements and collaborated on AI experiments, but which competes for audience attention.
- Amazon
Partner in the Artist-Centric strategy, with a role also in distributing music content.
- Udio
Licensing partner for an AI music creation platform, previously a litigation subject before the agreement.
News & filings
In the press
No news in our archive over the last 180 days.
Annual reports (ESEF)
- Annual report 202507 Apr 2026
- Annual report 202415 Apr 2025
Sources
- [1] Annual report, fiscal year ended 2025-12-31 (ESEF) · SEC / Universal Music Group N.V. · 31 Dec 2025
Figures computed by olivLaw from ESEF annual reports and closing prices; the qualitative analysis is AI-generated from cited sources. Not investment advice.