olivLaw · US equity research
Ambow Education Holding Ltd. AMBO
Services-Educational Services · SIC 8200 · Vertical: Services-Educational Services (SIC 8200)
Ambow Education Holding Ltd. is a Cayman Islands holding company whose U.S. subsidiaries run NewSchool of Architecture & Design and the HybriU AI platform for education, corporate conferencing and live events. Revenue remains very small and rose slightly in the first half of 2026 to 5.2 million USD, while HybriU licensing and sales declined.
At the close of 04 Nov 2026, Ambow Education Holding Ltd. (AMBO) stock was 1.61 USD (+0.63% on the day), with market capitalisation 62.3 m USD, P/E 68.2 on diluted EPS of 0.02 USD over the last 12 months, beta -0.27, 52-week range 1.35–4.83 USD. Latest reported quarter (Q2 2026): revenue of 2.4 m USD (−13.5% YoY), net income of -146.0 k USD (−108.2% YoY), diluted EPS -0.00 USD.
Data as of · AI analysis dated · Source: SEC filings and closing prices, computed by olivLaw.
Price history
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Technical reading
- RSI (14)
- 44.0
- weak (30–45)
- Bollinger (20, 2)
- 1.40 – 1.90
- in the lower half of the band · %B 0.42 · band width 30.6%
- SMA 50 / 200
- 1.88 / 2.18
- downtrend (price < SMA50 < SMA200)
- MACD (12, 26, 9)
- -0.11 / -0.11
- MACD above signal
Indicators describe past prices; on their own they do not predict direction. On our history the RSI ≤ 40 filter added no return (see the signals methodology).
Performance
| Company | S&P 500 | vs S&P 500 | Vertical median | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 month | −12.1% | −1.1% | −11.0 pp | — |
| 3 months | −19.1% | −0.5% | −18.6 pp | — |
| 6 months | −25.5% | +4.4% | −29.9 pp | — |
| Year to date | −41.7% | +12.3% | −54.0 pp | — |
| 1 year | −54.0% | +13.5% | −67.5 pp | −30.3% |
| 3 years | +10.3% | +76.4% | −66.1 pp | −18.2% |
| 5 years | −87.4% | +63.7% | −151.1 pp | — |
Price returns, dividends excluded.
Quarterly results
Latest quarter: Q2 2026 · 30 Jun 2026
Quarterly margins
Quarterly statements · USD
| Fiscal year | Q1 '25 | Q2 '25 | Q1 '26 | Q2 '26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 2.3 m | 2.8 m | 2.8 m | 2.4 m |
| Cost of revenue | 978.0 k | 1.3 m | 1.1 m | 1.2 m |
| Gross profit | 1.3 m | 1.5 m | 1.7 m | 1.2 m |
| Research & development | 101.0 k | 102.0 k | 156.0 k | 220.0 k |
| Operating income | 138.0 k | 329.0 k | 442.0 k | -128.0 k |
| Interest expense | 12.0 k | 29.0 k | -16.0 k | 5.0 k |
| Pre-tax income | 109.0 k | 1.8 m | 434.0 k | -142.0 k |
| Income tax | — | 47.0 k | 10.0 k | 4.0 k |
| Net income | 109.0 k | 1.8 m | 424.0 k | -146.0 k |
| Diluted EPS | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.00 |
| Operating cash flow | -923.0 k | 1.9 m ≈ | -1.2 m | 1.1 m ≈ |
≈ derived quarter (cumulative difference / share-days average)
E/P over time
E/P = trailing-12-month diluted EPS / price at quarter end. E/P is the inverse of P/E and stays defined when earnings are negative.
Today's P/E sits at the 0 percentile of its own 3-quarter history (min 116.9, median 339.4, max 388.9; quarters with earnings only).
Fiscal years
| Fiscal year | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | ⚠ 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 77.3 m | 83.9 m | 81.5 m | 17.8 m | 14.8 m | 9.2 m | 9.4 m | 9.5 m |
| Revenue YoY | unavailable | +8.5% | −2.8% | — | −16.7% | −38.3% | +2.5% | +0.8% |
| Net income | 6.5 m | -14.4 m | -9.6 m | 470.0 k | -14.3 m | -3.2 m | 309.0 k | 1.4 m |
| Net income YoY | −8.4% | −319.4% | unavailable | — | −3,144.3% | unavailable | unavailable | +339.8% |
| Diluted EPS | 0.16 | -0.33 | -0.22 | -0.14 | -0.19 | -0.06 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Diluted EPS YoY | unavailable | −306.3% | unavailable | — | unavailable | unavailable | unavailable | +337.0% |
| net % | 8.5% | -17.1% | -11.8% | 2.6% | -96.4% | -34.7% | 3.3% | 14.4% |
| Free cash flow | 3.7 m | unavailable | unavailable | unavailable | unavailable | unavailable | 435.0 k | -463.0 k |
The series breaks before 2021: earlier years come from the original reports of the issuer of that time, later years from a subsequent filing that restated the perimeter (a separation, discontinued operations). The year-on-year change across the break is not shown.
Reported results vs expectations
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Balance sheet & financial health
Fiscal year 2025 · 31 Dec 2025
- Cash
- 831.0 k USD
- Financial debt
- 3.2 m USD
- Net debt
- 2.4 m USD
- Equity
- 8.3 m USD
- Total assets
- 20.8 m USD
- Debt / equity
- 0.39x
- Current ratio
- 2.20x
- ROE
- 18.1%
- ROA
- 7.1%
- FCF margin
- -4.9%
Financial statements (source on every figure)
Revenue and net income (USD)
Margins
Income statement · USD
| Line | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Source (latest year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 81.5 m | 17.8 m | 14.8 m | 9.2 m | 9.4 m | 9.5 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Cost of revenue | 59.4 m | 15.4 m | 14.6 m | 6.7 m | 4.4 m | 4.3 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Gross profit | 22.1 m | 2.4 m | 284.0 k | 2.5 m | 5.0 m | 5.2 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Research & development | 874.0 k | 2.3 m | — | 484.0 k | 438.0 k | 628.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Operating income | -19.1 m | -8.6 m | -9.5 m | -4.3 m | -722.0 k | 112.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Depreciation & amortisation | 4.8 m | 378.0 k | 226.0 k | 18.0 k | 16.0 k | 77.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| EBITDA | -14.3 m ≈ | -8.3 m ≈ | -9.3 m ≈ | -4.3 m ≈ | -706.0 k ≈ | 189.0 k ≈ | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026derived |
| Interest expense | — | — | 101.0 k | 57.0 k | 63.0 k | -103.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Pre-tax income | -9.6 m | -7.2 m | -9.3 m | -3.2 m | -530.0 k | 1.4 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Income tax | 163.0 k | -505.0 k | — | 14.0 k | -839.0 k | 6.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Net income | -9.6 m | 470.0 k | -14.3 m | -3.2 m | 309.0 k | 1.4 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Diluted EPS | -0.22 | -0.14 | -0.19 | -0.06 | 0.01 | 0.02 | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Weighted average diluted shares | 44.4 m | 46.7 m | 49.5 m | 56.3 m | 57.1 m | 57.6 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
≈ computed by olivLaw from the reported lines of the same year: Operating income + Depreciation & amortisation.
Balance sheet · USD
| Line | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Source (latest year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | 18.2 m | 24.7 m | 3.3 m | 274.0 k | 1.1 m | 831.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Receivables | 3.2 m | 4.0 m | 2.0 m | 2.3 m | 2.5 m | 2.3 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Inventories | — | — | — | — | — | 80.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Current assets | 65.0 m | 70.3 m | 15.8 m | 12.5 m | 11.6 m | 10.9 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Property, plant & equipment, net | 22.1 m | 16.0 m | 276.0 k | 6.0 k | 1.2 m | 2.0 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Goodwill | 3.9 m | 3.4 m | — | — | — | — | SEC (XBRL)· 02 May 2022verified |
| Intangibles (excl. goodwill) | 8.4 m | 4.7 m | 537.0 k | 522.0 k | 512.0 k | 1.7 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Total assets | 160.9 m | 152.2 m | 25.5 m | 20.6 m | 17.4 m | 20.8 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Accounts payable | 3.0 m | 4.6 m | 2.4 m | 1.4 m | 749.0 k | 1.6 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Short-term debt | 1.5 m | 1.6 m | 3.0 m | 3.9 m | 2.7 m | 500.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Long-term debt | 1.5 m | — | — | — | — | 2.7 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Current liabilities | 98.6 m | 94.7 m | 11.9 m | 9.8 m | 6.8 m | 4.9 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Total liabilities | 139.2 m | 129.2 m | 17.6 m | 14.1 m | 10.6 m | 12.5 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Equity | 20.4 m | 21.3 m | 7.9 m | 6.4 m | 6.7 m | 8.3 m | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
Cash flow · USD
| Line | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Source (latest year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 738.0 k | -2.5 m | — | — | 1.6 m | 137.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Capex | — | — | — | — | 1.2 m | 600.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Free cash flow | — | — | — | — | 435.0 k ≈ | -463.0 k ≈ | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026derived |
| Investing cash flow | -15.1 m | 16.8 m | — | — | -2.0 m | -987.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
| Financing cash flow | 8.5 m | 916.0 k | — | — | -1.2 m | 500.0 k | SEC (XBRL)· 13 Feb 2026verified |
≈ computed by olivLaw from the reported lines of the same year: Operating cash flow − Capex.
Computed indicators
Growth
Profitability
Returns
Balance sheet
Liquidity
Cash
Efficiency
Market and valuation
1 indicators that do not apply to the sector.
Valuation
olivLaw classification
Score: 32 / 100
A scoring methodology on indicators and valuation, not investment advice.
score < 40
Closing price
04 Nov 2026Source: olivLaw, closing series
Market cap: 62.3 m USD
Key indicators
Coverage and freshness
Score by group
- Balance sheet70
- Growth0
- Valuation0
- Quality37
Estimated value range
The combined range = the median of the valid methods' low, central and high values; it is not a probability interval and does not cover every result. Envelope of all methods: 0.04 – 0.04 USD.
Valuation assumptions are editorial choices, not measured; beta is not measured.
Method ranges (USD per share)
— — Mid · ▏ Price
Valuation methods
- DCF (discounted cash flow)unavailable · the base of the ratio is not positive
- Peers: EV/EBITDA0.04 – 0.04 (Mid 0.04)6 companies used · median multiple 8.1x · quartiles 7.7x – 8.8xAPEI, LAUR, LFS, LGCY, LINC, LRN
- Peers: P/Eunavailable · the base of the ratio is not positive
- Dividend discount (DDM)unavailable · the company pays no dividend: a dividend model needs an explicit initiation assumption
Classification (SIC) comparables group by industry code, not by economic activity; the direct group is an editorial selection by activity. Members' multiples are on their own trailing twelve months, at their own latest close.
Assumptions (illustrative, editorial)
- Risk-free rate
- 4.3%
- Equity risk premium
- 5.0%
- Beta (default)
- 1.00
- Cost of equity
- 9.3%
- Terminal growth
- 2.5%
Factor scorecard
Unattractive profile · Score 32/100
| Factor | Value | Score | Weight used |
|---|---|---|---|
| ROIC · Quality | -0.5% | 33 (vs peers) | 16% |
| Net margin · Quality | -2.6% | 42 (vs peers) | 10% |
| FCF conversion · Quality | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| Revenue CAGR 3Y · Growth | -13.9% | 0 (on a fixed band) | 13% |
| EPS CAGR 3Y · Growth | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| Net debt / EBITDA · Balance sheet | -35.3x | 100 (vs peers) | 16% |
| Interest coverage · Balance sheet | -0.3x | 0 (on a fixed band) | 10% |
| Current ratio · Balance sheet | 2.4x | 100 (on a fixed band) | 6% |
| P/E (TTM) · Valuation | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| EV/EBITDA · Valuation | 1,695.5x | 0 (vs peers) | 16% |
| FCF yield · Valuation | -2.5% | 0 (on a fixed band) | 13% |
| Shareholder yield (distributions) · Returns | unavailable | unavailable | — |
| Payout ratio (FCF) · Returns | unavailable | unavailable | — |
Factors without a value were dropped; the remaining weights were renormalised.
Score groups
- Balance sheet70/100 · 3/3 factors with a value
- Growth· partial0/100 · 1/2 factors with a value
- Quality37/100 · 2/3 factors with a value
- Returns· partialunavailable · 0/2 factors with a value
- Valuation0/100 · 2/3 factors with a value
A «partial» group is computed from under half of its weight or from one factor: it is not a full assessment of the group.
Memo
AMBOW EDUCATION HOLDING LTD. (AMBO). Latest full fiscal year: 2025; data up to 2026-06-30.
Figures computed from the financial statements: revenue 9.5 m USD in 2025; YoY growth 0.8%; net margin -2.6%; ROE -2.9%; net debt/EBITDA -35.2x.
The estimated value range is 0.04–0.04 USD per share (median of 1 methods, agreement: single method); assumptions are illustrative. Against the central value of 0.04 USD, the price of 1.61 USD leaves a potential of -97.5% (value / price − 1) and a margin of safety of -3,889.0% (1 − price / value). The range is the median of the methods' low, central and high values, not a probability interval.
olivLaw score 32/100, methodological classification: unattractive profile (score, margin of safety and method agreement together; not a judgement of the right price). Groups assessed only in part: growth, returns. Not investment advice.
Text generated deterministically from the figures shown; no language model. Not investment advice.
What supports the thesis
- Net debt / EBITDA: -35.2x
- Current ratio: 2.4x
What contradicts it
- Revenue CAGR 3Y: -13.9%
- Interest coverage: -0.3x
- EV/EBITDA: 1,695.5x
- FCF yield: -2.5%
- The price is above the estimated value range
Not assessed (insufficient data or a ratio without meaning): FCF conversion, EPS CAGR 3Y, P/E (TTM), Shareholder yield (distributions), Payout ratio (FCF).
Versus the vertical median
Services-Educational Services (SIC 8200) · same industry (4-digit SIC) · compared with 39 companies
Multiples and returns vs the median
Price rebased to 100 (monthly, 5 years)
Companies in the vertical
| Market cap | P/E | ROE | Net margin | Revenue YoY | 1A / 3A | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EDUNew Oriental Education & Technology Group Inc. | 80.7 bn | 169.7 | 12.4% | 8.4% | +15.5% | +2% / −36% |
| LAURLaureate Education, Inc. | 4.8 bn | 12.9 | 34.1% | 20.3% | +8.6% | +14% / +168% |
| CVSACovista Inc. | 4.1 bn | 17.0 | 17.9% | 12.8% | +9.3% | +34% / +118% |
| COE51Talk Online Education Group | 4.1 bn | — | — | -17.6% | +88.6% | −73% / +43% |
| LOPEGrand Canyon Education, Inc. | 3.9 bn | 18.2 | 31.0% | 19.6% | +7.1% | −4% / +10% |
| LRNStride, Inc. | 3.3 bn | 10.9 | 20.9% | 13.2% | +4.7% | +25% / +31% |
| NAMIJinxin Technology Holding Company | 2.6 bn | — | -89.7% | -22.8% | +6.1% | −89% / unavailable |
| DAOYoudao, Inc. | 2.5 bn | 159.2 | — | 1.6% | +9.6% | +105% / +397% |
| PRDOPerdoceo Education Corp | 1.9 bn | 10.9 | 17.6% | 20.6% | +24.2% | +7% / +72% |
| STRAStrategic Education, Inc. | 1.7 bn | 12.4 | 8.2% | 10.5% | +4.0% | −5% / −16% |
| YQ17 Education & Technology Group Inc. | 1.5 bn | — | -46.5% | -145.6% | −41.5% | −41% / +14% |
| UTIUniversal Technical Institute, Inc | 1.2 bn | 36.3 | 10.5% | 3.9% | +14.0% | −3% / +91% |
| PXEDPhoenix Education Partners, Inc. | 794.4 m | 9.5 | 30.1% | 8.7% | +1.0% | −36% / unavailable |
| APEIAmerican Public Education, Inc. | 776.2 m | 17.5 | 15.6% | 6.8% | +3.9% | +22% / +439% |
| LINCLincoln Educational Services Corporation | 637.9 m | 28.0 | 11.9% | 4.0% | +17.8% | −2% / +117% |
| JZJianzhi Education Technology Group Company Limited | 522.3 m | — | -44.4% | -22.4% | −70.6% | −98% / −100% |
| GOTUGaotu Techedu Inc. | 373.9 m | — | -20.8% | -5.3% | +40.9% | −0% / −9% |
| IHiHuman Inc. | 245.2 m | 22.8 | 10.0% | 11.8% | −8.7% | −60% / −59% |
| FEDUFour Seasons Education (Cayman) Inc. | 210.5 m | 46.6 | 6.8% | 12.1% | +7.6% | −30% / +13% |
| LXEHLixiang Education Holding Co. Ltd. | 155.2 m | — | -83.1% | -395.4% | −1.9% | −63% / −99% |
| LGCYLegacy Education Inc. | 118.1 m | 14.0 | 19.5% | 11.4% | +24.8% | −12% / unavailable |
| EEIQEpicQuest Education Group International Limited | 93.6 m | — | -34.8% | -27.2% | +9.6% | −23% / −81% |
| VSAVisionSys AI Inc | 81.8 m | 0.3 | — | 164,963.8% | −99.9% | −97% / −100% |
| CHGGChegg, Inc | 71.1 m | — | -30.7% | -17.2% | −39.0% | −34% / −94% |
| AMBOAmbow Education Holding Ltd. | 62.3 m | — | -2.9% | -2.6% | +0.8% | −54% / +10% |
1- and 3-year price returns: for AMBO from daily closes (the same as the performance table), for the other companies from month-end closes.
olivLaw engine forecast
The world engine ran after the company's latest material disclosure. Probabilities are of TOUCHING a level within the horizon (not closing there) and sit next to the random walk (p_rw), the no-information benchmark.
The engine has no published run for this company yet.
Valuation scenarios (editable assumptions)
Illustrative scenarios
Illustrative: not forecasts and without probabilities. Each case is one coherent set of assumptions, computed on today's figures.
Estimated price (USD)
| Estimated price | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 years | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable |
| 3 years | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable |
| 5 years | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable | insufficient data Total return unavailable · Per year unavailable |
AI analysis
AI-generatedAI-generated analysis (Claude) from cited public sources; it may contain errors. Not investment advice. As of 27 Oct 2026 · Model: claude-haiku-5-5.
In brief
Ambow Education Holding Ltd. is a Cayman Islands holding company whose U.S. subsidiaries run NewSchool of Architecture & Design and the HybriU AI platform for education, corporate conferencing and live events. Revenue remains very small and rose slightly in the first half of 2026 to 5.2 million USD, while HybriU licensing and sales declined.
SWOT
Strengths
- The company has relatively controlled costs, with gross margin rising and general and administrative expenses reduced in recent years.
- The HybriU product portfolio is broad, covering education, conferencing, events and translation, which gives several options for development.
- NewSchool holds regional accreditation and access to federal student aid programs, which supports student recruitment.
Weaknesses
- Revenue is very small and profitability in recent years has depended on a one-time gain from a lease settlement.
- HybriU licensing revenue fell in the second quarter of 2026, showing dependence on individual orders and contracts with limited history.
- The company depends on a small number of senior executives, and losing them could disrupt operations.
Opportunities
- Further international partnerships for HybriU could increase licensing revenue, as in the agreement with a Singapore-based company.
- New AI product launches and a wider HybriU offering could attract customers in education, corporate and event industries.
- Micro-credential programs and institutional partnerships could diversify sources of education revenue.
Threats
- Competition from larger institutions and technology providers could reduce market share and pressure margins.
- Legislative changes on student financing and regulation of for-profit institutions could affect enrollment.
- Reputational risks linked to AI algorithms or data practices could undermine customer trust in HybriU.
Risks
- Dependence on student enrollmenthigh
If enrollment falls or fees must be cut because of competition, revenue and profitability could decline.
- Adoption and success of AI technologyhigh
The company cannot assure that its HybriU investments will generate sufficient revenue, and products could be harder to adopt than expected.
- Volatile licensing revenuemedium
HybriU licensing and sales revenue has fluctuated, and individual orders can significantly influence quarterly results.
- Dependence on key personnelmedium
Loss of senior management or qualified teaching staff could affect program quality and the company's reputation.
- Structure of the investmentlow
Investors hold shares in the Cayman holding company rather than directly in the U.S. subsidiaries, which could complicate the exercise of their rights.
Investment thesis
What would need to be true (bull case)
- If HybriU attracts more corporate and institutional clients, licensing revenue could return to a higher level and support more durable growth.
- Rising gross margin and cost control could lead to better operating results if revenue continues to grow.
- International partnerships and product launches could widen the customer base and diversify revenue sources.
What would break the thesis
- Revenue is very small and fell in the second quarter of 2026, which could signal difficulty in turning HybriU into a stable source of income.
- Recent profit was influenced by an unusual gain, and without it results could be negative.
- Competition in higher education and hybrid technology could limit growth and pressure margins over the long term.
What to watch
- Trend in HybriU licensing revenue and new ordersQ3 2026
- Enrollment at NewSchool and the evolution of tuition2027
- Research and development spending on HybriU and its effect on profitabilitynext 10-K
- Level of cash and working capital, including restricted cashQ3 2026
Products, market & competition
AI-generatedAI-generated analysis (Claude) from cited public sources; it may contain errors. Not investment advice. As of 27 Oct 2026 · Model: claude-haiku-5-5.
The business
Ambow Education Holding Ltd. has no operating business of its own; its operations are conducted by U.S. subsidiaries delivering educational programs and technology solutions. The company was founded in 2000, expanded into the U.S. in 2017 through the acquisition of a higher education institution, and after exiting China in 2022 and closing Bay State College in 2023 focused on NewSchool and HybriU.
Net revenues were 9.5 million USD in fiscal 2025 and 5.2 million USD in the first half of 2026, according to the 10-K, 10-Q and results release. Growth in the first half was driven by educational programs and services, while HybriU revenue fell in the second quarter of 2026.
The company states that investors hold equity only in the Cayman holding company and not directly in its U.S. operating subsidiaries, a structural point that could matter when assessing an investment.
Segments
Educational programs and services
This line includes NewSchool of Architecture & Design in San Diego, a for-profit institution of higher education with bachelor's and master's programs in architecture and design. It was the main driver of total revenue growth in the first half of 2026.
HybriU licensing and sales
HybriU combines AI solutions for education, corporate conferencing, live events, real-time translation and knowledge capture. Revenue in this line fell in the second quarter of 2026 and no cost of revenue was recorded in the first half, which points to sensitivity to individual orders.
AI product development
The company has increased research and development spending on the HybriU platform, which could generate future revenue if adoption grows. The commercial timing remains uncertain because revenue from this direction has so far been modest.
Market context
Ambow operates at the intersection of hybrid communication, digital events and education technology. Demand depends on the adoption of hybrid formats, technological progress and the need for scalable solutions serving both in-person and remote participants, factors that could affect revenue if the market expands.
In U.S. higher education, enrollment and tuition depend on legislative uncertainty, regulatory activity and macroeconomic conditions, which could affect over the long term the company's ability to attract students.
Trends
- Adoption of hybrid formatstailwind
Wider use of hybrid formats in education and conferencing could favor the HybriU platform if institutions and companies adopt the proposed solutions.
- Artificial intelligence in educationmixed
Interest in AI in education could open commercial opportunities, but the technology evolves rapidly and the company acknowledges uncertainty about the success of its investments.
- Competitive pressure in higher educationheadwind
Competition from public and private institutions, some with greater resources or lower tuition, could reduce enrollment and margins at NewSchool.
- Regulatory and macroeconomic uncertaintyheadwind
Legislative changes, regulatory activity and economic conditions can affect demand for educational programs in ways that are hard to anticipate over the long term.
Competitive position
In U.S. higher education Ambow competes with public and private two-year and four-year colleges, other for-profit schools and alternatives to higher education. Competitors can have substantially greater resources and can offer lower tuition through government subsidies or donations.
In the HybriU area the company faces firms that focus on a single business line and can adapt more quickly to technology and student preferences, which could limit Ambow's market share.
- Public and private U.S. higher education institutions
Compete with NewSchool through similar programs, sometimes at lower tuition thanks to public funding or donations.
- Other for-profit higher education institutions
Offer competing programs to the same students and may have larger resources for marketing and development.
- Specialized educational technology firms
Compete with the HybriU platform through hybrid learning solutions adapted more quickly to technological change.
- Providers of hybrid conferencing and event solutions
Offer remote participation and real-time translation systems that compete directly with HybriU Conference and WeSpeak.
Links, dependencies and risks
Who the company is tied to, from its own SEC filings (customers, suppliers, production, partners, competitors, countries, regulation), from the 5 %+ holders' statements (13D/13G) and from what other companies say about it. Click a node for its evidence; on a listed company the graph moves to it.
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News & filings
In the press
No news in our archive over the last 180 days.
SEC filings
- Current report14 Aug 2026Results of operations · Financial statements and exhibits
- Quarterly report14 Aug 2026
- Current report30 Jul 2026Other events · Financial statements and exhibits
- Current report18 Jun 2026Other events · Financial statements and exhibits
- Current report28 May 2026Other events · Financial statements and exhibits
- Current report19 May 2026Other events · Financial statements and exhibits
- Current report11 May 2026Results of operations · Financial statements and exhibits
- Quarterly report11 May 2026
- Annual report13 Feb 2026
- Current report12 Jan 2026Departure or appointment of officers · Financial statements and exhibits
Sources
- [1] Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 2025-12-31 · SEC / Ambow Education Holding Ltd. · 13 Feb 2026
- [2] Form 10-Q, quarter ended 2026-06-30 · SEC / Ambow Education Holding Ltd. · 14 Aug 2026
- [3] Form 8-K, results release (exhibit 99.1) · SEC / Ambow Education Holding Ltd. · 14 Aug 2026
Figures computed by olivLaw from SEC filings and closing prices; the qualitative analysis is AI-generated from cited sources. Not investment advice.