Author
Milton Friedman
2 reading cards from 2 books · 1968–1970.
2 cards
The Role of Monetary Policy · 1968
The Taylor rule does not say what the central bank will do, but how far its policy stands from a simple benchmark.
In 1993 John Taylor published ‘Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice’ in the Carnegie-Rochester series, with a simple rule that described the Federal Reserve’s interest rate for 1987–1992 fairly well: i = π + 0.5·y + 0.5·(π − 2) + 2. Here i is the nominal policy rate, π is inflation over the previous four quarters, y is the output gap in percent, and the two at the end are the inflation target and the neutral real rate. It is not the law by which central banks decide but a benchmark. The mechanism lies in the inflation coefficient: π enters once directly and 0.5 times in the gap from the target, so for every extra point of inflation the rate rises by 1.5 points and the real rate goes up (the Taylor principle). When the rule is violated, the real rate falls as inflation rises, as in the 1970s according to some estimates. In July 2022, with euro-area inflation at 8.6% in June, the ECB raised its deposit rate from −0.50% to 0.00%; it reached 4.00% only in September 2023. The effect is transmitted through credit, asset prices, the exchange rate and expectations, with Friedman’s ‘long and variable’ lags. The main limit is that the neutral rate cannot be observed: it is estimated, and the estimates fell after 2008 and were revised after 2022. The output gap is revised too, sometimes by whole points. For a forecaster, the rule is a plausibility band: if the central bank stays far below it, the useful question is what the bank knows or fears, not whether the rule is wrong.
“The first and most important lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy can do—and it is a lesson of the most profound importance—is that monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source of economic disturbance.”
The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory · 1970
In the long run prices follow money relative to output, but in the short run velocity, expectations and supply shocks matter.
The equation of exchange, MV = PY, was formulated by Irving Fisher in 1911: the quantity of money M times the velocity of circulation V equals the price level P times real output Y. As an identity it is true regardless; it becomes a theory when V is assumed stable and Y is set by real factors, in which case prices follow money. Milton Friedman summed up the position in 1970, in his Wincott lecture ‘The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory’: inflation is a monetary phenomenon. The rival was the Phillips curve: in 1958 A. W. Phillips found, in British data for 1861–1957, an inverse link between unemployment and wage growth. Edmund Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) showed that the link vanishes in the long run if people adjust their expectations, and the 1970s proved them right: high inflation and high unemployment at once. Paul Volcker tightened monetary policy from October 1979; American inflation fell from 14.8% in March 1980 to an average of 3.2% in 1983, at the price of unemployment of 10.8% in December 1982. The 2021–2023 wave took another form: supply shocks in energy and logistics, and the euro-area annual rate reached 10.6% in October 2022. The limits are real. Velocity V did not stay stable after 1980, and central banks gradually abandoned money-supply targets. Supply shocks can raise prices without money growing faster. For a forecaster two things matter: the anchoring of expectations (when they come loose, disinflation costs more) and the lag, of the order of 12–24 months, between policy and prices.
“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.”