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Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence
by Hélène Rey · 2013 · 1 reading card
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Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence · 2013
The currency in which the world holds reserves and takes on debt also transmits its issuer’s monetary policy, not merely confidence in it.
At the Bretton Woods conference (July 1944) the world chose a dollar convertible into gold at 35 dollars an ounce, and the other currencies were pegged to the dollar. Robert Triffin showed in Gold and the Dollar Crisis (1960) the contradiction in the system: to supply the world with reserves, the US had to run external deficits, but the deficits increased dollar liabilities relative to the gold stock and weakened confidence in convertibility. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, when he was France’s finance minister in the 1960s, called the American advantage an ‘exorbitant privilege’: Washington borrowed in its own currency. The dilemma was resolved by a rupture: on 15 August 1971 President Nixon suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold, and in the following years fixed rates gave way to floating ones. The dollar nevertheless remained the dominant currency. According to the IMF (COFER), at the end of 2024 the dollar made up 57.8% of allocated reserves, and the renminbi 2.18%. Hélène Rey argued in 2013, at Jackson Hole, that a global financial cycle, tied to US monetary policy and to risk appetite, moves capital flows whatever the exchange-rate regime: monetary autonomy requires a managed capital account. The limits: the COFER share also moves through exchange rates, not only through decisions; in the last quarter of 2024 its rise was due, according to the IMF, to the depreciation of the other currencies against the dollar. Others argue that the exchange-rate regime still protects partially. For a forecaster, the share in reserves is a slow variable with valuation effects; it says nothing about invoicing, payments or debt, where the dollar may follow a different path.
“[…] independent monetary policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed, directly or indirectly via macro-prudential policies.”