Book
Rationalist Explanations for War
by James D. Fearon · 1995 · 1 reading card
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Rationalist Explanations for War · 1995
War comes not because the sides would not want a deal, but because they cannot believe one.
In «Rationalist Explanations for War» (International Organization, 1995), James Fearon started from an awkward question: war destroys resources, so both sides should prefer a negotiated settlement. If they fight nonetheless, something prevents a deal. Fearon identifies three rational explanations: private information with incentives to misrepresent it, commitment problems and the indivisibility of the stake. The other popular explanations (irrationality, mistakes, domestic politics) are not rejected, but these three can be modelled without assuming leaders do not think. The mechanism. Private information: each side knows its own capability and resolve better than the adversary does, and each has an interest in seeming stronger; so statements are not trustworthy, and fighting sometimes becomes the way of finding out. The commitment problem: a deal made today does not hold if one side will grow stronger tomorrow, so the other prefers to strike first. Indivisibility: some stakes (a holy city, a throne) cannot be shared, though Fearon notes that compensation can usually be negotiated. Limits: the model assumes unitary, rational actors, and for forecasting the question remains how you measure ‘private information’. What it means for the forecaster: wars are rare, and most disputes end without fighting, so the base rate is low; it rises when signals appear that remove uncertainty (costly mobilisation) or when a rapid shift of power makes a commitment no longer credible.
“Because war is costly and risky, rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war.”