“The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others.”Alfred Thayer Mahan · The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 · 1890 · Alfred Thayer Mahan, «The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783», Little, Brown, 1890, cap. I «Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power» (traducerea noastră)
A narrow lane turns a small threat into large leverage, but only as long as detours stay expensive.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer, published «The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783» in 1890. His thesis: the history of great powers is largely explained by control of commercial sea routes, and such control requires a battle fleet, bases and a trade worth defending. He lists the conditions of sea power: geographical position, physical conformation of the coasts, extent of territory, population, national character and the character of the government. The book influenced naval policy in the United States, Germany and Japan in the following decades. The modern mechanism is the chokepoint: a narrow passage through which a large share of a flow moves. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), about 20 million barrels a day passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024, roughly one fifth of world consumption of petroleum liquids. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, begun in November 2023, cut Suez transits by 42% in only two months, according to UNCTAD, and ships went round Africa, adding days to Asia–Europe routes. The Bosporus is a legal case: the Montreux Convention (1936) gives Turkey control over the passage of warships, above all in wartime. Limits: sea power does not automatically mean the will to use it; alternative routes, stocks and pipelines blunt the shock; and cheap missiles and drones have lowered the cost of threatening a lane. For the forecaster the useful question is not ‘can it be closed?’ but ‘for how long, with what detour and with what response?’.
Worked example: ‘Ever Given’, 23–29 March 2021, and the arithmetic of Hormuz. On 23 March 2021 the container ship ‘Ever Given’, about 400 m long, wedged itself across the Suez Canal, at a single-lane stretch. The canal stayed blocked until 29 March: six days in which hundreds of ships waited at either end or chose the detour round Africa. For the analyst the episode tests a simple claim: ‘Suez is a chokepoint’.
What it shows: an accident with no political intent could halt a significant part of Asia–Europe trade; but the blockage was short and the queue cleared within weeks. The conclusion is neither ‘lanes are fragile’ nor ‘they are safe’, but that duration matters as much as the existence of a blockage. For the Red Sea the figures after November 2023 show something else: not an accident but a persistent threat, and UNCTAD measured a 42% fall in transits within two months; the routes round Africa add, according to shipping lines, some 10–14 days on Asia–Europe voyages.
Now the arithmetic of Hormuz, with EIA figures for 2024: about 20 million barrels a day pass through the strait; the pipelines of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates can bypass, by EIA’s estimate, about 2.6 million barrels a day. The ratio: 2.6 divided by 20 is 0.13, so 13% of the flow has a bypass. That leaves 20 − 2.6 = 17.4 million barrels a day with none, or 87%. Over a year, 17.4 million × 365 days is 6,351 million barrels, about 6.4 billion.
These numbers do not predict a closure; they fix the size of the shock if one occurred, plus one important detail: over 80% of the crude passing through Hormuz goes to Asian markets, so the pressure is not equal for all consumers.
For the forecaster: the base rate of ‘lane blockages’ is not one figure but several classes. The first: accidental blockages (like ‘Ever Given’), lasting days; the second: military or quasi-military closures, rarer, of unknown duration in advance; the third: disruption by threat to ships (the Red Sea), which can last years. You build each class by counting episodes in the trade press and in shipping-line reports, then computing the median duration.
Indicators to follow, with the source: daily transits through Suez and Bab el-Mandeb (the International Monetary Fund’s PortWatch portal); oil flows and bypass routes (the US Energy Information Administration); container freight rates (the Drewry World Container Index); notices to mariners (the International Maritime Organization and the EU naval operation Aspides).
The typical trap is to confuse traffic volume with importance: a high-traffic strait may have a cheap bypass, while a low-traffic one may be irreplaceable (access to a single port, for instance). A second: forecasting ‘closure’ without defining it (zero transits? a 50% fall? a ban on one flag?).
Example scorable question: ‘According to PortWatch, will the average daily number of transits through the Suez Canal in December 2027, computed as the mean of all days of the month, be below 50, on data published by 15 January 2028?’ It resolves yes/no from the published series; if the series is no longer available, the question is voided.
Why it matters Hormuz carries about a fifth of world oil consumption, yet the pipelines of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can bypass at most about 2.6 million barrels a day, or 13% of the flow.