olivlaw

From books

States arm out of fear, and one’s arming frightens another; so the balance of power does not maintain itself, and neighbours react to threat more than to mere power.

Tucidide (trad. Richard Crawley) · History of the Peloponnesian War · 1874 · Tucidide, «Istoria războiului peloponesiac», V.89, dialogul melian, traducerea engleză a lui Richard Crawley (1874) (redarea română: traducerea noastră)3 minutes readpublic domain
“...since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”Tucidide (trad. Richard Crawley) · History of the Peloponnesian War · 1874 · Tucidide, «Istoria războiului peloponesiac», V.89, dialogul melian, traducerea engleză a lui Richard Crawley (1874) (redarea română: traducerea noastră)

States do not balance against the strongest, but against the most threatening.

In the Melian dialogue (416 BC, in book five), Thucydides has the Athenians say that right matters only between equals. The sentence became the emblem of realism in international relations. Kenneth Waltz gave the theory a strict form in «Theory of International Politics» (1979): the international system is anarchic, with no authority above states, and states, whatever their regime, behave alike because the structure forces them to fend for themselves. Robert Jervis showed in «Cooperation under the Security Dilemma» (World Politics, 1978) how this structure produces a trap; the term had been launched by John Herz in 1950. The mechanism of the security dilemma: what a state does to feel safe (arms, alliances, bases) makes its neighbours less safe, and they respond in kind. Jervis shows that the intensity depends on two things: whether attack is cheaper than defence and whether defensive weapons can be told apart from offensive ones. Stephen Walt added in «The Origins of Alliances» (1987) that states balance first against threat (power, geographical proximity, offensive capability, perceived intentions), not against the greatest power. Limits: the model assumes unitary, rational states; sometimes states align with the strong (bandwagoning), and domestic politics can break the logic. For the forecaster the useful question is whether a neighbour reads a military move as offensive or defensive, since the reaction depends on the reading.

Worked example: the Anglo-German naval race and London’s choice. Britain based its security on its fleet: from the Naval Defence Act (1889) it aimed for a navy at least equal to the next two naval powers combined. Germany, after Tirpitz’s naval laws of 1898 and 1900, began building a battle fleet, which it justified as a ‘risk’ Britain should not take in a war with it. From Berlin’s view it was a fleet of prestige and bargaining; from London’s, a fleet concentrated in the North Sea, a few days from the English coast.

That is how the security dilemma works. London’s answer was HMS Dreadnought, launched in February 1906, a ship that made existing fleets obsolete and reduced the British numerical lead: now only new-type ships counted, and Germany could build them. Germany responded by building too. Attempts at understanding, among them Haldane’s mission to Berlin in 1912, failed, because Berlin wanted a British neutrality clause that London could not give.

What did London do diplomatically? It did not ally with the strongest and did not bandwagon with Germany. It concluded the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and a convention with Russia in 1907, though it had had years of colonial rivalry with both. Walt would say: Britain balanced against the state that threatened it most directly (the German fleet, its closeness to the coast, the pace of building), not against the state with the largest land army.

The lesson for the analyst: an arms spiral does not require aggressive intentions on either side; it requires only that each read the other’s posture as offensive.

For the forecaster: the security dilemma has no base rate of its own, but it has observable reference classes. The first: pairs of states with simultaneously rising military spending, measured by SIPRI; you count how many such pairs in the last 30 years ended in armed conflict and how many concluded a limitation agreement (such as arms-control treaties). The second: episodes in which an alliance took in new members and the neighbour responded militarily.

Indicators, with the source: states’ military expenditure (the SIPRI database); announced exercises and deployments (communiqués of defence ministries and of NATO); arms-control treaties in force (the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs); official rhetoric, quoted from public speeches.

The typical trap: treating any rise in a defence budget as a sign of aggression. It may answer a real threat, and not answering may be more dangerous. A second trap: assuming the other side sees things as you do; the reading of a posture depends on its perception, not on your intent.

Example scorable question: ‘Will at least 20 NATO member states exceed 2% of GDP in military spending, according to the annual expenditure report published by NATO in 2027 (data for 2026), published by 31 December 2027?’ It resolves by counting from the official table; if NATO does not publish the annual report, the question is voided.

Why it matters At the Hague summit in June 2025 NATO allies agreed to reach 5% of GDP on defence and security by 2035, a jump the security-dilemma literature reads as a response to a perceived threat and, at the same time, as a signal the neighbours will read in their turn.

Balancing:against theBandwagoning:with the strong
States choose between the two pans of the scale, by the cost and credibility of each.

← Back to the feed