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From books

When energy demand cannot adjust quickly, a small supply shortfall requires a big price jump: short-run elasticity, not the size of the shock, decides how violently the market moves.

Daniel Yergin · The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power · 1991 · Winston Churchill, prim-lord al Amiralității, Camera Comunelor, 17 iulie 1913 (Hansard, vol. 55), dezbaterea despre trecerea flotei pe păcură; citat și de Daniel Yergin în «The Prize» (1991) (traducerea noastră)3 minutes read
“Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety, and in variety alone.”Daniel Yergin · The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power · 1991 · Winston Churchill, prim-lord al Amiralității, Camera Comunelor, 17 iulie 1913 (Hansard, vol. 55), dezbaterea despre trecerea flotei pe păcură; citat și de Daniel Yergin în «The Prize» (1991) (traducerea noastră)

The less elastic energy demand is in the short run, the bigger the price jump that a small supply shortfall produces.

Daniel Yergin placed oil at the centre of twentieth-century political history in The Prize (1991), which received the Pulitzer Prize in 1992. The economic idea behind it is simple: in the short run energy has inelastic demand, because people do not change their car, power plant or heating from one day to the next. An economy's vulnerability then depends on two things: how concentrated supply is and how small the elasticity is. If short-run demand elasticity is small, a modest supply shortfall requires a large price jump. In October 1973 the OAPEC members declared an embargo. On 22 December 1973 the Gulf producers raised the posted price of the marker crude from 5.12 to 11.65 dollars a barrel, effective 1 January 1974. The mechanism repeated in European gas in 2022: the front-month TTF contract reached around 319 euros per MWh on 26 August 2022. And today the vulnerability has moved to the refining of critical materials: in 2024, according to the International Energy Agency, China refined about 91% of rare earths and produced 94% of sintered magnets. The limit: elasticity rises over time, because people and firms adapt, and stocks and substitution cushion the shock. The 1973 embargo worked less well as a ‘selective’ weapon than as a price shock, because oil is redirected among buyers. For the forecaster, a market with concentrated supply, small stocks and small elasticity produces violent prices from small shocks; when stocks are large, the shock fades.

Worked example: 1973 and a relation you can calculate. On 22 December 1973 the Gulf producing states decided to raise the posted price of the marker crude from 5.12 to 11.65 dollars a barrel, effective 1 January 1974. The rise: (11.65 − 5.12) / 5.12 = 6.53 / 5.12 ≈ 1.275, that is +127.5%. The posted price is not the spot-market price, but it shows the order of magnitude: in about two months from the start of the embargo, the reference price more than doubled.

How large must the supply shortfall be for such a jump? With short-run demand elasticity ε (negative), the percentage price change needed to balance the market after a shortfall of ΔQ/Q is, to a first approximation, −(ΔQ/Q) / ε. Suppose, for the example, an effective shortfall of 7% (an illustrative figure, not the historical one). If ε = −0.1: 0.07 / 0.1 = 0.70, so +70%. If ε = −0.3: 0.07 / 0.3 ≈ 0.233, so +23%. If ε = −0.05: 0.07 / 0.05 = 1.40, so +140%.

A single parameter, unknown in real time, changes the answer about sixfold (from 23% to 140%). The linear approximation does not hold for large shocks, where the shape of the curve matters, but the order of magnitude is enough to see the logic. This is also why price forecasts during an energy shock are so badly calibrated: they depend on a parameter nobody observes until after the event.

In European gas in 2022 the mechanism was the same, with one difference: stocks. The front-month TTF contract reached around 319 euros per MWh on 26 August 2022; as storage filled and consumption fell, effective elasticity rose, and the price came back.

For the forecaster: the reference class is made up of energy supply shocks with a clear date (1973, 1979, 1990, 2022) and is counted by what fraction of the pre-shock price was reached at the peak. With only four or five cases, fine base rates cannot be made; wide intervals can. For critical materials there is not yet a class of episodes: Chinese export controls are too few and too recent.

Indicators to watch, with the public source. The level of gas stocks in Europe: the AGSI+ platform of Gas Infrastructure Europe, daily. Contract prices: ICE Endex (TTF) for gas, ICE for Brent. The oil supply and stocks situation: the monthly report of the International Energy Agency and the data of the US Energy Information Administration. For critical materials: the IEA's Global Critical Minerals Outlook and the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, both annual.

The typical trap: confusing the posted, administered price with the market price, or one contract month with another. A ‘record high’ figure without the contract specified cannot be resolved. The second trap: treating supply concentration as the only variable; without small stocks and small elasticity, concentration does not produce violent prices.

A scorable example question, illustrative: ‘Will the front-month TTF contract close above 100 €/MWh at ICE Endex in at least one session between 1 January and 31 December 2027?’ Resolution: the series of daily closes published by ICE Endex; the contract is identified by the ‘front month’ rule on the date of the session; the closing price counts, not the intraday high.

Why it matters The TTF contract reached around 319 euros per MWh in the summer of 2022, a level nobody considered plausible a year earlier, precisely because gas demand elasticity was small.

Elastic demand:stable priceInelasticdemand: violent
The same supply shock moves the price far more the more rigid demand is.

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