“Intentions aside, when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception.”Graham Allison · Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? · 2017 · Graham Allison, «Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?», Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017, formulare redată după citări secundare, pagina neverificată (traducerea noastră)
A list of cases chosen by the author after knowing the outcome says what the author wanted to show, not how often something happens.
The idea that war threatens when a rising power catches up with a dominant one comes from A.F.K. Organski, who in World Politics (1958) formulated power transition theory: the international order is a hierarchy, and the danger is greatest when a power dissatisfied with the existing rules approaches parity with the dominant one. Graham Allison popularised the idea under the name ‘Thucydides's Trap’ and made it the central thesis of Destined for War (2017): of 16 cases in the past 500 years in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one, 12 ended in war. The mechanism invoked: the rising power demands status and influence, the dominant one fears loss, alliances tie both sides' hands, and a minor crisis can trigger a major conflict. The most discussed case is the Anglo-German rivalry before the First World War. The cases without war include the rivalry between Portugal and Spain at the end of the fifteenth century and the Cold War between the US and the USSR. The criticism is strong. Joseph Nye and others argue that some cases are misidentified, and the list was compiled by the author, after the theme had been chosen. With 16 cases and a sample largely European, any rate is very uncertain. For the forecaster, the lesson is methodological: a reference class of 16 cases chosen by the author is not a base rate. The useful benchmark is an explicit inclusion rule, applied before seeing the outcomes.
Worked example: what the 12 out of 16 say, and what they do not. Take Allison's figure: 16 cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one, of which 12 ended in war. The fraction: 12 / 16 = 0.75.
First step: if the probability of war were 50% in each case, what are the chances of seeing at least 12 wars out of 16? Count the combinations: C(16,12) = 1,820, C(16,13) = 560, C(16,14) = 120, C(16,15) = 16, C(16,16) = 1, 2,517 in all. Divided by 2^16 = 65,536, that gives 0.0384, or 3.8%. Provisional conclusion: if the list were a random sample, 12 out of 16 would contradict a 50% rate at a conventional threshold.
Second step: the interval. The 95% Wilson interval for 12 out of 16 covers roughly 51%–90%. With 16 cases, any rate has a large uncertainty: from ‘a little over half’ to ‘almost nine in ten’.
Third step, the decisive one: selection. The list was compiled by the author, after choosing the theme. Suppose, as an exercise, that a wider list added 8 cases without war, for example parity rivalries that were resolved peacefully and that the author did not identify. The rate would be 12 / 24 = 0.50. We do not say that this is what happened: we say that a single inclusion decision moves the rate by 25 percentage points. Joseph Nye disputes precisely the identification of some cases.
What remains: a research hypothesis, not a base rate. To become a rate, you need a rule written in advance, for example: ‘pairs of states in which the rising power has at least 80% of the dominant power's capability, measured by a public index’. With the rule applied across the whole period, the list is rebuilt, and the rate is reported with an interval.
For the forecaster: the reference class is built from the inclusion rule, not from the catalogue. A serious source for capabilities is the Correlates of War project, with the CINC index (Composite Index of National Capability); for conflicts, the database of militarised interstate disputes. The rate is counted over pairs of states and years, not over ‘rivalries’ chosen by narrative. If the rule yields too few cases, say so: a wide interval, not a smooth figure.
Indicators to watch, with the public source. The ratio of the challenger's GDP to that of the dominant power: the IMF, World Economic Outlook, twice a year. Military spending: SIPRI, annual. Military incidents between the two sides: defence ministry statements and independent monitoring sources, read with care. Alliances and commitments: the public texts of treaties.
The typical trap: treating a historical analogy as law. ‘1914’ is one case among many, and a similar path does not guarantee a similar outcome. The second trap: treating the absence of war so far as proof that the thesis is false; a rate of 75% leaves 25% for peace, and a small sample refutes nothing.
A scorable example question, illustrative: ‘Will SIPRI report, in its database published in April 2027, that China's military spending for 2026, in constant dollars, exceeds 40% of that of the US?’ Resolution: the constant-dollar series in the SIPRI database; the ratio is computed from the values published in the April 2027 edition; a later revision of the series does not change the outcome.
Why it matters The US–China rivalry is often framed as ‘Thucydides's Trap’, but a serious forecast begins by asking which reference class, built by which rule, stands behind the figure of 12 out of 16.