“The world's population is projected to grow from 8.2 billion in 2024 to a peak of around 10.3 billion in the mid-2080s, then decline slightly, to around 10.2 billion by the end of the century.”Organizația Națiunilor Unite, Departamentul pentru Afaceri Economice și Sociale (Divizia Populație) · World Population Prospects 2024 · 2024 · Organizația Națiunilor Unite, DESA, «World Population Prospects 2024», comunicat de presă din 11 iulie 2024, redat după relatări, nu cuvânt cu cuvânt (traducerea noastră)
Over a twenty-year horizon, those who will be 40 are already born, which is why the age structure is the most reliable social forecast.
The demographic transition, formulated from the observations of Warren Thompson (1929) and developed by Frank Notestein (1945), describes the shift from high mortality and high birth rates to low mortality and low birth rates. Mortality falls first, population grows, then birth rates fall and growth slows. The key benchmark is the replacement fertility rate, about 2.1 children per woman in low-mortality countries: below it, each generation is smaller than the one before. The dependency ratio, the number of people over 65 relative to those aged 15 to 64, shows the pressure on pensions and health systems. The mechanism is cohort inertia. A person born in 2026 will be 20 in 2046; those who will be 50 in 2046 are already alive today, and their forecast depends only on mortality and migration. Romania offers an example: Decree 770 of 1966, which banned abortion, almost doubled the number of births in 1967, and the large cohorts of that time are now moving toward retirement age. Between the censuses of 1992 and 2021 the population fell from 22.81 to 19.05 million. Limits: migration and future fertility. In World Population Prospects 2024, where the world's population is projected to peak at about 10.3 billion in the 2080s, the projected population for 2100 is 6% lower than in the edition of ten years earlier, mainly because fertility fell faster than expected, especially in China. For the forecaster, the age structure at 20 years is very safe for those over 20 and very uncertain for those not yet born.
Worked example: Romania between two censuses. The census of 7 January 1992 counted 22,810,035 people (the stable population). The 2021 census counted 19,053,815 people (the resident population), according to the National Institute of Statistics. The difference: 22,810,035 − 19,053,815 = 3,756,220. Relative to 1992: 3,756,220 / 22,810,035 ≈ 0.165, a fall of 16.5%. Over 29–30 years, that means an average fall of about 0.6% a year: ln(19,053,815 / 22,810,035) ≈ −0.180, and −0.180 / 29.9 ≈ −0.006.
Watch the definitions: in 1992 the stable population was counted, in 2021 the resident one. The two are not identical, so the 16.5% figure is an order of magnitude, not a precise measurement. A serious forecaster notes this in the criterion of the question and names the exact source.
The second calculation, replacement. If a country had a fertility of 1.7 children per woman (an illustrative value) and low mortality, the ratio 1.7 / 2.1 ≈ 0.81 shows that each generation is about 81% of the size of the preceding one, that is, about 19% smaller. Over a generation of roughly 30 years, the fall is visible but slow, and migration can offset or aggravate the result. The calculation is not a forecast but an order-of-magnitude test: if a scenario requires a faster fall than this, it must explain by what, for example emigration.
The third step: the cohort. Whoever is between 50 and 54 in 2046 was born between 1992 and 1996. The cohort exists; it can grow only through immigration and shrinks through mortality and emigration. That is why its 20-year forecast is safe, unlike that of children born in 2045, who do not yet exist. Any figure about them is a fertility scenario, not an observation.
For the forecaster: the reference class for demography is not a base rate of events but the historical errors of projections. It is built by comparing projections published 10–20 years ago with today's results: errors on total population are small over 10 years and grow with the horizon, and the largest come from migration and fertility. The United Nations' world projection for 2100 was revised down by 6% in the 2024 edition compared with that of a decade earlier: an order of magnitude for revisions.
Indicators to watch, with the public source. Annual births and deaths, the fertility rate: the National Institute of Statistics (TEMPO) and Eurostat. Migration flows: Eurostat and the immigration statistics of destination countries. Official projections: the United Nations, World Population Prospects, and Eurostat's projections. The old-age dependency ratio: Eurostat, by country.
The typical trap: treating a projection as a fact, without reading the fertility and migration assumptions it rests on. The second trap: comparing censuses with different definitions (stable and resident population) as though they counted the same thing.
A scorable example question, illustrative: ‘Will the number of live births in Romania in 2026, from the INS's first press release on 2026, be below 140,000?’ Resolution: the INS release published in 2027 on the natural movement of the population in 2026; the figure from the first publication is used, not later revisions; if the INS does not publish by 31 December 2027, the question is voided.
Why it matters Between the 1992 and 2021 censuses Romania's population fell by about 3.76 million people, or 16.5%, and those who will be 50 in 2046 are already alive.