“Put bluntly, public debt may have no fiscal cost.”Olivier Blanchard · Public Debt and Low Interest Rates · 2019 · Olivier Blanchard, «Public Debt and Low Interest Rates», American Economic Review, vol. 109, nr. 4, 2019, pp. 1197–1229, rezumat (versiunea de lucru NBER nr. 25621) (redarea română: traducerea noastră)
Debt stabilises when the primary balance covers the gap between the interest rate and nominal growth times the debt, not when it reaches a threshold.
The dynamics of public debt are arithmetic. With d debt as a percentage of GDP, r the average nominal interest rate, g nominal GDP growth and sp the primary balance (the surplus before interest), the annual change is Δd = (r − g)/(1 + g) · d − sp. Debt rises if the interest rate exceeds growth or if the primary deficit is large. Olivier Blanchard, in his 2019 AEA presidential address ‘Public Debt and Low Interest Rates’, showed that in the United States the safe rate had stayed below growth for a long time, which makes debt easier to carry than is commonly believed. The historical example is the postwar one: US federal debt held by the public fell from about 106% of GDP in 1946 to about 23% in 1974, not through huge surpluses but through high nominal growth and low real interest rates. In 2010 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff argued in ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’ that above 90% of GDP growth falls sharply; in 2013 Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin found a spreadsheet error, exclusions of years and weighting choices, and average growth at debt above 90% came out at +2.2%, not −0.1%. The Maastricht Treaty sets 3% for the deficit and 60% for debt, two figures linked arithmetically: at 5% nominal growth, a 3% deficit stabilises debt at 3/0.05 = 60%. Limits: r and g are not constant, and r depends on market confidence: when investors demand a risk premium, the rate rises just when debt is high. For a forecaster the useful indicator is not a magic threshold but the gap r − g and the primary balance, together with the debt structure (maturities, currency).
Worked example: the path of debt over five years, exact calculation. Start with d = 60% of GDP, an average nominal interest rate r = 6%, nominal growth g = 7% and a primary deficit of 4% of GDP (sp = −4). The formula: next d = d · (1 + r)/(1 + g) − sp. The factor 1.06 / 1.07 = 0.990654.
year calculation debt (% of GDP)
0 - 60.0
1 60.0 × 0.990654 + 4 63.4
2 63.44 × 0.990654 + 4 66.8
3 66.85 × 0.990654 + 4 70.2
4 70.22 × 0.990654 + 4 73.6
5 73.57 × 0.990654 + 4 76.9(The calculation was done with full decimals and rounded only at the end: 63.439; 66.846; 70.222; 73.565; 76.878.) Debt climbs by about 3.4 points a year even though the interest rate is below growth: the primary deficit of 4 points far outweighs the gain of 0.56 points a year from the gap r − g, that is, (0.06 − 0.07) / 1.07 × 60 ≈ −0.56.
What primary balance would have stabilised debt at 60%? The one for which Δd = 0: sp = (r − g)/(1 + g) · d = −0.56, a primary deficit of 0.56% of GDP. With a deficit of 4%, the country is 3.4 points a year away from stabilisation. Had the interest rate been 8% instead of 6% (g staying at 7%), the factor becomes 1.08 / 1.07 = 1.009346, and after five years debt reaches about 83.2%, that is 6.4 points higher. Two points more interest, a little over 6 points more debt in five years: that is why the path is forecast from r − g, not from today’s level. The rule to remember: any primary deficit larger than (r − g)/(1 + g) · d pushes debt up, however small the interest rate may look.
For the forecaster: base rate and indicators. At the end of 2024 Romania’s government debt was about 55% of GDP (Eurostat), below the 60% reference, while the ESA deficit was 9.3% of GDP, the largest in the EU. The Ministry of Finance also reported a ‘cash’ deficit of 8.65%: the difference between the cash basis and the accrual basis (ESA) is a classic resolution trap.
The reference class is counted from Eurostat’s excessive-deficit notifications: how many member states had, in a given year, a deficit above 3% of GDP and how many of them brought it below the threshold within the next two years; for debt thresholds the IMF’s Historical Public Debt Database can be used. No probability is attached before counting.
Indicators to watch: Eurostat’s government deficit and debt notifications (April and October); monthly budget execution (Ministry of Finance); the 10-year government bond yield and the average cost of debt (BNR, Ministry of Finance); nominal GDP growth (INS).
The trap: using a threshold as a law. 90% or 60% do not produce a crisis by themselves; what matters is who holds the debt, in which currency it is issued and how fast it rolls over. A second trap: comparing figures on different bases (cash, ESA, gross or net debt).
A scorable question (illustrative): ‘Will Eurostat report, in the April 2027 excessive-deficit notification, a Romanian general-government ESA deficit for 2026 above 6.0% of GDP?’ Resolution source: the Eurostat release of the April 2027 notification, the value for 2026, first published.
Why it matters At the end of 2024 Romania’s government debt was about 55% of GDP, below the 60% threshold, but with an ESA deficit of 9.3% of GDP: the arithmetic of the trajectory matters more than today’s level.