“The random walk model performs as well as any estimated model at one to twelve month horizons for the dollar/pound, dollar/mark, dollar/yen and trade-weighted dollar exchange rates.”Richard A. Meese și Kenneth Rogoff · Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do They Fit Out of Sample? · 1983 · Richard A. Meese și Kenneth Rogoff, «Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do They Fit Out of Sample?», Journal of International Economics, vol. 14, 1983, rezumat (redarea română: traducerea noastră)
A fixed rate with free capital means giving up independent monetary policy, and once the market stops believing in the anchor, defending it costs more than the government promised.
The monetary trilemma follows from the model formulated independently by Marcus Fleming (1962, IMF Staff Papers) and Robert Mundell (1963): a country cannot have at once a fixed exchange rate, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy; it picks two of the three. With free capital and a fixed rate, the domestic interest rate is tied to that of the anchor country. The mechanism: if the market believes the fixed rate will not hold, defending it takes high interest rates and reserves. Britain joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in October 1990, at 2.95 marks to the pound, in a band of ±6%. With German rates high after unification, on 16 September 1992 the Bank of England raised its rate from 10% to 12% and then announced 15% the same day, but in the evening the government pulled sterling out of the mechanism; in the following weeks it adopted an inflation target. Rüdiger Dornbusch (1976, ‘Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics’) showed that, with sticky prices, the exchange rate can overshoot its new equilibrium before coming back. Uncovered interest parity says that the currency with the higher interest rate is expected to depreciate by the difference. In practice parity does not hold well: high-interest currencies usually depreciate less than the formula says, which is why carry trades exist. Meese and Rogoff (1983) showed that at horizons of 1–12 months no structural model beats a random walk. For a forecaster: exchange rates are not predicted point by point; regimes (anchor, band, defence) and breaking points are forecast.
Worked example: 16 September 1992, then the arithmetic of parity. Britain joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in October 1990 at 2.95 German marks to the pound, in a band of ±6%. The lower edge of the band, about 2.78 marks, lay at 2.78 / 2.95 − 1 ≈ −5.8% from the central parity. The trilemma reads directly: sterling had a fixed rate (the mechanism), free capital (exchange controls had been abolished in 1979) and wanted its own monetary policy, because the British economy was in recession in 1990–1991 and would have needed lower rates, while the Bundesbank held rates high after German unification.
On 16 September 1992 the Bank of England raised its rate from 10% to 12% in the morning, then announced 15%, and in the evening the government withdrew sterling from the mechanism. The next day the rate was back to 10%. The lesson: a promise (‘we will defend the parity’) is worth the cost the government is willing to pay, and the market computes that cost.
Uncovered interest parity, with illustrative (not historical) figures: domestic rate 6.5%, euro rate 2.5%, spot 4.90 lei per euro. The one-year rate implied by parity: 4.90 × 1.065 / 1.025 = 4.90 × 1.03902 = 5.09. Check with 1,000 lei: at the domestic rate they give 1,065 lei; converted into euro, 1,000 / 4.90 = 204.08 euro, which at 2.5% give 209.18 euro, and reconverted at 5.09 give 209.18 × 5.09 ≈ 1,065 lei. Equality means the market expects no difference. If a year later the actual rate is 4.95, the same 209.18 euro are worth 1,035.4 lei, a loss against 1,065 for whoever chose the euro; conversely, whoever borrows in euro gains. When high-interest currencies depreciate less than parity predicts, the carry trade wins and parity is rejected empirically.
For the forecaster: the reference class. For the breaking of a managed or fixed exchange-rate regime, the reference class is built from crisis databases: Laeven and Valencia (IMF) for currency crises 1970–2011, and Reinhart and Rogoff’s ‘This Time Is Different’ for their history; count how many countries with an anchor regime saw a depreciation of more than 15% within a year, relative to the total number of country-years with an anchor. We do not have a verified base number here; it is obtained by counting, with thresholds fixed in advance.
Indicators to watch: the EUR/RON reference rate and international reserves (BNR, monthly releases); the gap between the BNR’s policy rate and the ECB’s (BNR, ECB); the current-account balance and its financing (BNR, see lesson 13); implied volatility and forward quotes, where public (ECB for reference rates).
The trap: taking a managed rate as proof of a fixed regime. The BNR smooths movements but does not guarantee a parity; a long period of stable rates says nothing about the cost of defending it. A second trap: forecasting a point value at 3–12 months with a structural model, when Meese and Rogoff show that ‘today’s rate’ is a hard benchmark to beat.
A scorable question (illustrative): ‘Will the EUR/RON reference rate published by the BNR exceed 5.2000 on at least one business day between 1 January and 31 December 2027?’ Resolution source: the daily reference rate published by the BNR, four decimals; exactly 5.2000 does not count; if the BNR stops publishing the rate, the forecast is void.
Why it matters The BNR intervenes in the foreign-exchange market to limit the leu’s volatility: for a question about the exchange rate, the regime and the reserves say more than any structural model.