“First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. […] Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking securities […].”Walter Bagehot · Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market · 1873 · Walter Bagehot, «Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market», Henry S. King, Londra, 1873, cap. VII, par. 58–59 (ediția digitală Econlib); româna: traducerea noastră
A financial crisis is prepared in credit and in the structure of funding, and Bagehot’s remedy is dear, unlimited liquidity against good collateral.
Walter Bagehot set out the rule that bears his name in Lombard Street (1873): in a panic, the central bank lends freely, at a very high rate and against good collateral. The high rate, he wrote, acts as “a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity”: it discourages those who ask for money only out of fear. Hyman Minsky explained how we get there: after years of calm, funding slides from the hedge form (income pays interest and principal) to the speculative form (income pays only the interest) and to the Ponzi form (not even the interest). Charles Kindleberger, in Manias, Panics, and Crashes (1978), put the pieces in sequence: shock, credit boom, euphoria, panic. The mechanism has two halves. Before the crisis, credit grows faster than income: Schularick and Taylor showed in 2012, with data for 14 countries from 1870 to 2008, that credit expansion is a reliable signal of crisis risk. In the crisis, assets find no buyers and short-term funding disappears. On 15 September 2008 the investment bank Lehman Brothers, with assets of about 639 billion dollars, filed for bankruptcy protection, the largest bankruptcy in US history. Interbank markets froze, and central banks began supplying liquidity on an unusual scale, which is exactly what Bagehot had prescribed. The limits are real. The rule assumes you can tell an illiquid bank from an insolvent one, and in the middle of a panic that distinction is a judgement call; public support also raises moral hazard. Minsky explains why crises come, not when: fragility can last for years. Two things matter for a forecaster: credit and the structure of funding are tracked directly, not through statements, and a ‘banking crisis’ is a class of rare events with a countable base rate.
Worked example: three firms and a rising interest rate. Take three fictional firms, each with debt of 100 million, an annual principal repayment of 10 million and interest at 5%, so 5 million a year; the total obligation is 15 million. Their expected annual incomes differ:
Firm Income Interest Interest+principal Class (Minsky)
A 20 5 15 hedge (20 ≥ 15)
B 8 5 15 speculative (5 ≤ 8, but 8 below 15)
C 3 5 15 Ponzi (3 below 5)Firm B covers the interest but is 7 million short of the total obligation, which it obtains by refinancing; firm C covers not even the interest, and its debt grows by 2 million a year. Now the interest rate rises. At 8%, interest is 8 million and the total obligation 18: firm A (20 ≥ 18) stays hedge, firm B (8 = 8) only just pays its interest, and firm C has a deficit of 5 million a year. At 9% interest is 9 million and B, with income of 8, becomes Ponzi. Firm A changes class only above 10%: at 10%, interest (10) plus principal (10) equals its income of 20; at 11% the obligation is 21 and A becomes speculative.
Minsky’s point shows in the numbers: the same rise in the rate, from 5% to 11%, moves different firms at different moments, without any income having fallen. Each firm that moves to a more fragile class depends more on someone else refinancing its debt. On a real scale, 15 September 2008 showed what happens when many speculative borrowers depend on daily refinancing: Lehman Brothers, with assets of about 639 billion dollars, filed for bankruptcy protection that day, and short-term funding markets froze.
For the forecaster: the base rate. The database of Laeven and Valencia (IMF, 2018 edition) counts 151 systemic banking crises between 1970 and 2017, that is 151 / 48 ≈ 3.1 a year worldwide. The rate per country-year is obtained by dividing the number of crises by the number of country-years in the sample; it is small and is adjusted with the signals below, not replaced by them.
Indicators to follow: the credit-to-GDP gap (Bank for International Settlements, quarterly series for dozens of countries); house prices (BIS, Eurostat); the composite indicator of systemic stress, CISS, of the European Central Bank, daily for the euro area; for Romania, credit to the private sector and the share of non-performing loans in the National Bank of Romania’s financial stability report.
The typical trap: confusing a vulnerability with a date. Credit can grow for years without a crisis, and a good fragility signal is not a calendar signal. The second trap is the definition. Laeven and Valencia date a crisis by the intensity of the policy response (guarantees, nationalisations), so a question asking for a ‘systemic crisis’ must say which list resolves it and what happens if the list is revised.
Example of a scorable question: ‘Will the CISS indicator for the euro area, published by the European Central Bank in its Data Portal, exceed 0.50 on at least one business day between 1 January and 31 December 2027? The value in the series as published on 15 January 2028 is used; later revisions do not count.’ The question is illustrative and gets no probability here: you build one yourself, starting from the base rate of days above the threshold in the historical series.
Why it matters Lehman Brothers failed on 15 September 2008 with assets of about 639 billion dollars, and expanding credit remains the best early signal of a crisis.