“Financial liberalization usually predates banking crises; indeed, it helps predict them. Rather than a causal relationship from banking to balance-of-payments crises, the macroeconomic ‘stylized facts’ that characterize these episodes point to common causes.”Graciela L. Kaminsky, Carmen M. Reinhart · The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems · 1999 · Graciela L. Kaminsky, Carmen M. Reinhart, «The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems», Federal Reserve Board, IFDP nr. 544, 1996 (rezumat); American Economic Review 89(3), 1999 (traducerea noastră)
Net reserves, not the headline figure, and foreign-currency debt maturing within a year show how costly a sudden stop of capital would be.
Guillermo Calvo called a ‘sudden stop’, in 1998, the unexpected interruption of foreign capital inflows that forces a country to close its external deficit in a very short time. Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart showed in The Twin Crises (1999), on a sample of countries from the last decades of the twentieth century, that banking problems and balance-of-payments crises often appear together, and that financial liberalisation precedes both: the causes are common, not a simple link from banks to the exchange rate. Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann added ‘original sin’: a country that can borrow abroad only in foreign currency risks seeing a depreciation inflate its debt. The mechanism has a breaking point: reserves. The Guidotti–Greenspan rule asks that official reserves cover at least the external debt with residual maturity of up to one year. Thailand let its currency float on 2 July 1997, after gross reserves had fallen from 37.2 to 30.9 billion dollars in six months, while the central bank also held forward contracts of about 23 billion, so net reserves were far smaller. Romania went through a stop in 2008–2009: after Lehman’s failure, the financing of a current-account deficit of more than 10% of GDP withdrew, and the 2009 agreement with the IMF, the EU and other institutions came to about 20 billion euros. The limits: early-warning models give many false alarms, and crises are also self-sustaining, since a feared depreciation happens partly because it is feared. The three checks — reserve cover, external deficit, currency structure of debt — measure how large the damage would be, not when the shock comes; the timing is supplied by external shocks.
Worked example: Thailand’s gross and net reserves, 1997. Figures quoted in the literature on the crisis: the central bank’s gross foreign-exchange reserves were 37.2 billion dollars in December 1996 and 30.9 billion in June 1997, and the bank’s forward position (dollars sold forward, to be delivered later) reached about 23.4 billion.
Gross reserves, Dec 1996 37.2 bn $
Gross reserves, Jun 1997 30.9 bn $
Fall over six months 6.3 bn $ (6.3 / 37.2 = 16.9%)
Forward obligations 23.4 bn $
Net reserves = 30.9 − 23.4 7.5 bn $
Net reserves / gross reserves 24.3% (7.5 / 30.9)The reserve that mattered for defending the exchange rate was therefore a quarter of the one on display. The Guidotti–Greenspan rule is just as simple to apply. Take a fictional country with reserves of 40 billion and external debt with residual maturity of up to one year of 60 billion: cover is 40 / 60 = 66.7%, and the gap to the 100% threshold is 20 billion. A country with cover below 100% does not enter a crisis automatically, but it depends on refinancing the 60 billion every year: if lenders refuse, the 20-billion gap has to be closed by cutting imports, by depreciation or through an external agreement.
Romania in 2009, as an order of magnitude for such a gap: the announced package was about 19.95 billion euros, of which 12.95 billion from the IMF (64.9%), 5 billion from the European Union (25.1%), 1 billion from the World Bank (5.0%) and the remaining 1 billion or so (5.0%) from other international financial institutions. The IMF arrangement was approved by its Executive Board on 4 May 2009.
For the forecaster: the database of Laeven and Valencia (IMF) contains, besides banking crises, dated currency crises and sovereign debt crises, so the reference class can be counted by country and year; without a count, do not give a probability. A new episode is compared with episodes in which the same combination of vulnerabilities existed and no crisis followed, not only with those that ended badly.
Indicators to follow: official reserves against external debt with residual maturity of up to one year (the central bank’s external debt statistics, the World Bank, the BIS); the current-account balance (balance of payments published by the National Bank of Romania and Eurostat); the share of foreign-currency debt in public and private debt (the National Bank, the Ministry of Finance); the 10-year government bond yield and its spread over Germany (the National Bank, Eurostat).
The typical trap: treating vulnerability as a date. A country with weak reserve cover can go for years without a crisis, as long as lenders keep refinancing; the warning model says how large the damage would be, not when the shock starts. The second trap is the headline reserve: check whether part of it is encumbered by forward obligations or illiquid.
Example of a scorable question: ‘Will the IMF announce, in a press release on its website, approval by its Executive Board of a new financing arrangement (stand-by, extended or precautionary line) for Romania between 1 January and 31 December 2027? Resolution: IMF press releases in the period; a mere staff-level agreement does not count.’ The question is illustrative; it gets no probability here.
Why it matters In 2009 Romania received a package of about 20 billion euros (12.95 billion from the IMF) after external financing withdrew abruptly.