“England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may require the labour of 100 men for one year; and if she attempted to make the wine, it might require the labour of 120 men for the same time.”David Ricardo · On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation · 1817 · David Ricardo, «On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation», John Murray, Londra, 1817, cap. VII «On Foreign Trade» (text Econlib); româna: traducerea noastră
Trade gains come from relative cost, and an announced tariff becomes a price only once it is applied and someone pays it.
David Ricardo showed in On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation (1817, chapter VII) that two countries gain from trade even if one produces everything more cheaply: relative cost matters, not absolute cost. Each specialises in the good for which it gives up the least of the other. Jan Tinbergen added the gravity model in 1962: trade between two countries rises with the size of their economies and falls with the distance between them, a regularity that still holds in the data today. Tariffs strike at this mechanism, and the question is who pays them. The Smoot–Hawley Act, signed on 17 June 1930, raised American import duties on thousands of products, and partners answered with their own duties; economic historians still discuss how much of the collapse of trade in the 1930s is due to the Act and how much to the depression. For the 2018 case, Mary Amiti, Stephen Redding and David Weinstein (Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019) found complete pass-through of American tariffs into import prices: foreign exporters did not lower their prices, and the cost fell on American buyers. In the working-paper version of the study, the loss of real income was about 1.4 billion dollars a month by the end of 2018. The limits: Ricardo’s model has a single factor of production and fixed costs; it ignores job adjustment and modern supply chains, in which a part crosses the border several times and the tariff accumulates. For a forecaster, the announced tariff is not the applied tariff: the date of entry into force, the exemptions and what happens to imports ahead of the deadline all matter.
Worked example: the gain from specialisation, with Ricardo’s numbers. Costs in man-years, those of chapter VII of the 1817 work:
Cloth (man-years) Wine (man-years)
England 100 120
Portugal 90 80Portugal produces both goods with less labour, so it has an absolute advantage in both. Opportunity costs, however, show something else. In England 1 cloth costs 100 / 120 = 0.833 wine; in Portugal 1 cloth costs 90 / 80 = 1.125 wine. Cloth is cheaper, as a sacrifice of wine, in England; conversely, wine is cheaper in Portugal.
Without trade, each country makes 1 cloth and 1 wine: England uses 100 + 120 = 220 man-years, Portugal 90 + 80 = 170. Together: 2 cloth and 2 wine. With trade and the same labour, England makes only cloth: 220 / 100 = 2.2 cloth; Portugal only wine: 170 / 80 = 2.125 wine. Total output rises to 2.2 cloth and 2.125 wine, that is 0.2 cloth and 0.125 wine more.
Exchange takes place at a price between the two opportunity costs, for example 1 cloth for 1 wine (between 0.833 and 1.125). England sells 1.1 cloth and receives 1.1 wine: it ends with 1.1 cloth and 1.1 wine, against 1 and 1 before. Portugal sells 1.1 wine and receives 1.1 cloth: it ends with 1.1 cloth and 2.125 − 1.1 = 1.025 wine, against 1 and 1. The gains add up exactly to the total surplus: 0.1 + 0.1 = 0.2 cloth and 0.1 + 0.025 = 0.125 wine. Comparative advantage does not require anyone to be better at anything in absolute terms; it requires only that relative costs differ.
For the forecaster: a reference class for ‘announced tariffs that enter into force’ can be built from official notices (the Federal Register, USTR, the Official Journal of the EU): you count announcements, entry-into-force dates, the rate at entry and the rate after six months; without this counted table, give no probabilities. Think about the distance between announcement and application, not only about the size of the tariff.
Indicators to follow: tariff notices and exemption lists (Federal Register, USTR; the European Commission for the EU); monthly bilateral trade (the US Census Bureau, Eurostat Comext); the import price index (the Bureau of Labor Statistics); the World Trade Organization’s report on restrictive measures.
The typical trap: confusing the statutory rate with the effective rate. Exemptions, trade diversion through third countries and imports brought forward ahead of the deadline make the effective average tariff differ greatly from the announced one. The second trap is assuming the exporter pays; in the 2018 case pass-through into import prices was complete.
Example of a scorable question: ‘Will China’s share of US goods imports, according to the Census Bureau’s annual data for 2027, be below 10.0%? Resolution: the value in the country trade table published by 31 March 2028; later revisions do not count.’ The question is illustrative and gets no probability here; build one from the historical share series and from the calendar of tariffs already applied.
Why it matters In 2018 American tariffs were passed through completely into import prices, so the cost fell on buyers in the US, not on foreign exporters.