Author
Robert A. Pape
1 reading card from 1 book · 1997.
1 card
Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work · 1997
The success rate of sanctions depends more on the definition of success and the size of the aim than on the instrument itself.
The first great count of sanctions came from Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Elliott in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (first edition 1985; the third edition, of 2007, with Barbara Oegg, covers 174 cases from the twentieth century). The often-cited result: ‘at least partial’ success in about a third of cases; in the 1990 edition, 40 successes out of 115 cases. In 1997, in Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work (International Security), Robert Pape redid the list: of the 40 claimed successes, only 5 survive a strict definition. The difference between the two figures lies in the definition. HSE scores a partial or modest success as well; Pape requires that the main objective was achieved through economic pressure, not through the threat of force or other factors. The classic failure is Italy in 1935–1936: after the invasion of Ethiopia (3 October 1935), the League of Nations' sanctions took effect on 18 November 1935, but oil stayed outside them, and Italy completed the conquest in May 1936; the League's Assembly voted to lift them on 4 July 1936. Successful cases share a few traits: a limited aim, a target dependent on the issuer, a broad coalition and a target with no alternatives. The limits of the counts lie in selection and in the counterfactual: sanctions that were only threatened, and worked without being applied, rarely appear in the data, and what would have happened without sanctions is not observed. For the forecaster, the base rate depends on the aim: freeing a prisoner or winning a trade concession has different odds from changing a regime. The two figures do not contradict each other; they answer different questions.
“The world would have to change considerably before sanctions could become a credible alternative to force.”