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Sanctions seem to succeed in about a third of cases if you count generously and in under 5% if you count strictly: the gap comes from the definition of success, not from the data, and it shows when they really work.

Robert A. Pape · Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work · 1997 · Concluzia lui Robert A. Pape, «Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work», International Security, vol. 22, nr. 2, 1997, pp. 90–136, redată după rezumatul National Research Council (2000), nu verificată pe textul articolului (traducerea noastră)3 minutes read
“The world would have to change considerably before sanctions could become a credible alternative to force.”Robert A. Pape · Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work · 1997 · Concluzia lui Robert A. Pape, «Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work», International Security, vol. 22, nr. 2, 1997, pp. 90–136, redată după rezumatul National Research Council (2000), nu verificată pe textul articolului (traducerea noastră)

The success rate of sanctions depends more on the definition of success and the size of the aim than on the instrument itself.

The first great count of sanctions came from Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Elliott in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (first edition 1985; the third edition, of 2007, with Barbara Oegg, covers 174 cases from the twentieth century). The often-cited result: ‘at least partial’ success in about a third of cases; in the 1990 edition, 40 successes out of 115 cases. In 1997, in Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work (International Security), Robert Pape redid the list: of the 40 claimed successes, only 5 survive a strict definition. The difference between the two figures lies in the definition. HSE scores a partial or modest success as well; Pape requires that the main objective was achieved through economic pressure, not through the threat of force or other factors. The classic failure is Italy in 1935–1936: after the invasion of Ethiopia (3 October 1935), the League of Nations' sanctions took effect on 18 November 1935, but oil stayed outside them, and Italy completed the conquest in May 1936; the League's Assembly voted to lift them on 4 July 1936. Successful cases share a few traits: a limited aim, a target dependent on the issuer, a broad coalition and a target with no alternatives. The limits of the counts lie in selection and in the counterfactual: sanctions that were only threatened, and worked without being applied, rarely appear in the data, and what would have happened without sanctions is not observed. For the forecaster, the base rate depends on the aim: freeing a prisoner or winning a trade concession has different odds from changing a regime. The two figures do not contradict each other; they answer different questions.

Worked example: the same data, two definitions. Take a set of 115 sanctions cases from 1914–1990, in which the original authors claim 40 successes. Their rate: 40 / 115 ≈ 0.348, about 35% (in the 1990 edition the figure cited is 34%). Pape takes the 40 cases again and accepts 5. The fraction of the 40 claimed: 5 / 40 = 0.125, that is 12.5%. The fraction of the total of 115: 5 / 115 ≈ 0.043, under 5%. The same data, the same list of cases, so the difference from 35% to 4% comes entirely from the definition of success.

A case that shows the mechanism from the inside is Italy after the invasion of Ethiopia. Italy attacked on 3 October 1935 and the League of Nations' sanctions took effect on 18 November 1935, but the product Italy needed most for the war, oil, was not included, and the main suppliers were not part of the coalition. Italy completed the conquest of Ethiopia in May 1936, and the League's Assembly voted to lift the sanctions on 4 July 1936. In the terms of the lesson: a large aim (withdrawal from a country already occupied), a target that had alternatives, a coalition with gaps. The result is a failure from any perspective.

Now, how to use this in a forecast. Before putting a probability on ‘will the sanctions succeed?’, write down the aim: what is the objective, how many states apply the measure, how much of the target's trade passes through them and what alternatives the target has. If the answers are ‘large aim, partial coalition, alternatives available’, the relevant reference class is that of strictly successful sanctions, not the aggregate average. If the aim is modest, for example the release of some detainees, the reference class is different and the base rate is higher. The 35% figure is therefore not a probability but an average over incomparable aims.

For the forecaster: the reference class is chosen by aim. The sources of the counts are the academic databases: HSE (with the case set from the book published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics), the Global Sanctions Database and TIES (Threat and Imposition of Sanctions). Each has its own definition of success; before using a figure, read the definition and check whether the aim of your question is the same size as the aims of the cases counted. If it is not, say explicitly that the base rate is an approximation.

Indicators to watch, with the public source. New acts and lifting of measures: the Official Journal of the European Union and the SDN list of the US Treasury (OFAC). The target's trade with those applying the measures: Eurostat, UN Comtrade, the country's customs data. The target's exchange rate and reserves: the target's central bank and the IMF. A lagging but useful indicator: if the target redirects its trade toward states that do not apply the sanctions, the coalition has gaps.

The typical trap: taking the political statement as proof of success. A leader who ‘yields’ may do so for a reason unrelated to the sanctions, and a leader who does not yield proves nothing about them: if you do not know the counterfactual, you cannot attribute the outcome.

A scorable example question, illustrative: ‘Between 1 January and 31 December 2027, will OFAC remove from the SDN list at least 10 entries (persons or entities) associated with the same sanctions programme, according to OFAC's public recent-actions archive?’ Resolution: the OFAC archive; removed entries are counted, not amended ones; the date that counts is that of publication of the removal notice.

Why it matters Sanctions packages are now counted in dozens, but their success depends on the aim: whoever asks ‘will they work?’ without saying ‘for what?’ has not yet formulated a question.

Limited aim:better oddsRegime change:rare
The same tool, very different success rates depending on the size of the aim.

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