Author
Robert D. Putnam
1 reading card from 1 book · 1988.
1 card
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games · 1988
An international agreement happens only where the sets of ratifiable agreements of the two sides overlap.
In 1988, in Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games (International Organization), Robert Putnam proposed that we stop asking whether domestic politics determines foreign policy or the reverse, and instead picture a negotiator playing two games at once. At level I he negotiates with foreign counterparts; at level II he must obtain ratification at home, formal or informal. The set of agreements the domestic environment would accept is called the win-set. An agreement exists only if the win-sets of the two sides overlap, and the larger a win-set, the more likely the agreement. The mechanism has a counterintuitive consequence: a negotiator with a small win-set, that is, with a difficult ratification at home, can obtain bigger concessions at the table, because the partner knows he cannot ask for more anyway. The cost is the risk of failure. A historical example: on 19 March 1920 the US Senate voted 49 to 35 for the Treaty of Versailles, with Lodge's reservations, but 7 votes were missing for the two-thirds majority. Other works complete the framework: Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues, in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), show that a leader survives by satisfying the winning coalition within the selectorate, and James Fearon (1994) describes audience costs: a leader who has threatened publicly suffers at home if he backs down. Limits: the win-set is not observed, it is inferred. Audience costs have been challenged empirically, and regimes are not monolithic. For the forecaster, the question is who ratifies, by what majority and when; the parliamentary calendar and the arithmetic of majorities are public information.
“Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle.”