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A negotiator plays simultaneously at the international table and at home: an agreement is possible only if it lies in the set that can be ratified on both sides, and whoever has hands tied at home may win more at the table.

Robert D. Putnam · Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games · 1988 · Robert D. Putnam, «Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games», International Organization, vol. 42, nr. 3, 1988, pp. 427–460, propoziția de deschidere redată după descrieri secundare, neverificată pe PDF (traducerea noastră)3 minutes read
“Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle.”Robert D. Putnam · Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games · 1988 · Robert D. Putnam, «Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games», International Organization, vol. 42, nr. 3, 1988, pp. 427–460, propoziția de deschidere redată după descrieri secundare, neverificată pe PDF (traducerea noastră)

An international agreement happens only where the sets of ratifiable agreements of the two sides overlap.

In 1988, in Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games (International Organization), Robert Putnam proposed that we stop asking whether domestic politics determines foreign policy or the reverse, and instead picture a negotiator playing two games at once. At level I he negotiates with foreign counterparts; at level II he must obtain ratification at home, formal or informal. The set of agreements the domestic environment would accept is called the win-set. An agreement exists only if the win-sets of the two sides overlap, and the larger a win-set, the more likely the agreement. The mechanism has a counterintuitive consequence: a negotiator with a small win-set, that is, with a difficult ratification at home, can obtain bigger concessions at the table, because the partner knows he cannot ask for more anyway. The cost is the risk of failure. A historical example: on 19 March 1920 the US Senate voted 49 to 35 for the Treaty of Versailles, with Lodge's reservations, but 7 votes were missing for the two-thirds majority. Other works complete the framework: Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues, in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), show that a leader survives by satisfying the winning coalition within the selectorate, and James Fearon (1994) describes audience costs: a leader who has threatened publicly suffers at home if he backs down. Limits: the win-set is not observed, it is inferred. Audience costs have been challenged empirically, and regimes are not monolithic. For the forecaster, the question is who ratifies, by what majority and when; the parliamentary calendar and the arithmetic of majorities are public information.

Worked example: the US Senate and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919–1920. The treaty required ratification by two thirds of the senators present. On 19 November 1919 two votes took place. The resolution to ratify with Henry Cabot Lodge's reservations was defeated 39 to 55. With 94 votes cast, two thirds means 94 × 2/3 = 62.67, so the threshold was 63 ‘yes’ votes: 24 were missing. The resolution to ratify without reservations, supported by President Wilson, was defeated 38 to 53. With 91 votes, the threshold was 60.67, so 61: 23 were missing.

Read through Putnam: the Senate's win-set included the treaty with reservations, and Wilson's win-set included the treaty without them, but not with them. The two sets had no common point wide enough. On 19 March 1920, in a second vote, the resolution with Lodge's reservations received 49 ‘yes’ votes and 35 ‘no’ votes. Out of 84 votes, two thirds means 56, so 7 votes were missing for ratification.

The observation from the exercise: all three votes failed on arithmetic, not on diplomacy. A forecaster who had counted the votes in 1919 on both variants would have seen that neither reaches the two-thirds threshold, whatever the two camps said. The lesson is not that ‘the opposition won’ but that the ratification rule (two thirds) made the win-set very small, and when the domestic win-set is small, a successful negotiation at level I guarantees nothing at level II. The check is simple: count the votes required, then count the votes available.

For the forecaster: the reference class is the ratification of treaties in systems with qualified majorities. It is built by counting, for each treaty submitted in a given interval, how many were approved; for the US, treaty documents and votes are public on Congress.gov and on the Senate's site. For Romania, on the websites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. If you do not have such a count, do not invent a rate: say that you are using the arithmetic of majorities, not a base rate.

Indicators to watch, with the public source. The calendar and agenda of the ratifying body: the website of the parliament concerned. The arithmetic of majorities: the number of seats by group, from the parliament itself. Opinion polls in the country concerned: Eurobarometer or national polling institutions. Leaders' statements on red lines: official communiqués, read as a possible strategy, not as fact.

The typical trap: taking ‘tied hands’ as real. The statement ‘parliament would not vote for it’ may be true or may be a negotiating move; you check with the votes, not with the rhetoric. The second trap: forgetting that a signed agreement is not a ratified one. A signature at level I says nothing about level II.

A scorable example question, illustrative: ‘Will the US Senate approve, by a final vote with at least 67 ‘yes’ votes, the resolution of ratification of a treaty submitted to the Senate on 1 March 2027, by 31 December 2027, according to the roll-call record published by the Senate?’ Resolution: the official roll-call record; if no vote takes place, the outcome is ‘no’; amendments do not change the criterion.

Why it matters Any international agreement that requires a parliament's ratification, from trade treaties to defence procurement, depends on domestic arithmetic as much as on the external negotiation.

Win-set APossibleagreementsWin-set B
The agreement exists only in the overlap of the two ratifiable sets.

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