Book
Arms and Influence
by Thomas C. Schelling · 1966 · 1 reading card
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Arms and Influence · 1966
A threat is worth what it costs the one making it if he does not carry it out.
Thomas Schelling, an economist and game theorist, published «Arms and Influence» in 1966. The basic idea: military power is used not only when fighting but also when threatening; the capacity to do harm is a bargaining currency. Schelling distinguished deterrence, which persuades an adversary not to begin an action, from compellence, which persuades him to stop or undo something already begun. The first needs a threat that stays in reserve; the second needs a deadline, otherwise the adversary can delay indefinitely. The mechanism is credibility. A threat is credible if the adversary believes you will carry it out even after carrying it out costs you. Schelling describes ways of making it credible through commitments that tie your hands: troops left as a ‘tripwire’, a public deadline, a reputation put at stake. In 1962 the Cuban missile crisis showed both: on 22 October the US chose a ‘quarantine’ of Cuba, less escalatory than an attack, and on 28 October Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the missiles. Limits: credibility is judged by the one threatened, not by the one threatening; cheap signals do not build it, and a threat that is too large can make acceptance politically impossible for the other side. For the forecaster the useful question is what the signal costs the one who sends it: words are cheap, mobilisation and decisions with high domestic cost are not.
“The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.”