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Deterrence prevents an action not yet begun, compellence forces a stop or a withdrawal; both rest on credibility, meaning what words cost if they are not followed by deeds.

Thomas C. Schelling · Arms and Influence · 1966 · Thomas C. Schelling, «Arms and Influence», Yale University Press, 1966, cap. 1 «The Diplomacy of Violence» (traducerea noastră)3 minutes read
“The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.”Thomas C. Schelling · Arms and Influence · 1966 · Thomas C. Schelling, «Arms and Influence», Yale University Press, 1966, cap. 1 «The Diplomacy of Violence» (traducerea noastră)

A threat is worth what it costs the one making it if he does not carry it out.

Thomas Schelling, an economist and game theorist, published «Arms and Influence» in 1966. The basic idea: military power is used not only when fighting but also when threatening; the capacity to do harm is a bargaining currency. Schelling distinguished deterrence, which persuades an adversary not to begin an action, from compellence, which persuades him to stop or undo something already begun. The first needs a threat that stays in reserve; the second needs a deadline, otherwise the adversary can delay indefinitely. The mechanism is credibility. A threat is credible if the adversary believes you will carry it out even after carrying it out costs you. Schelling describes ways of making it credible through commitments that tie your hands: troops left as a ‘tripwire’, a public deadline, a reputation put at stake. In 1962 the Cuban missile crisis showed both: on 22 October the US chose a ‘quarantine’ of Cuba, less escalatory than an attack, and on 28 October Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the missiles. Limits: credibility is judged by the one threatened, not by the one threatening; cheap signals do not build it, and a threat that is too large can make acceptance politically impossible for the other side. For the forecaster the useful question is what the signal costs the one who sends it: words are cheap, mobilisation and decisions with high domestic cost are not.

Worked example: the Cuban missile crisis, 16–28 October 1962, read with the two concepts. On 16 October 1962 President Kennedy learned that photographs from a U-2 aircraft showed launch sites for Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba. For a week a small group of advisers weighed options, from an air strike to negotiation. On 22 October Kennedy announced on television a ‘quarantine’ of Cuba, enforced from 24 October, and demanded the withdrawal of the missiles.

This is compellence in Schelling’s sense: a demand to undo a situation already created, not to avoid a future one. The quarantine, rather than an attack, was chosen because it left Moscow room to manoeuvre: a Soviet ship could turn back without anyone firing. It is exactly the form of pressure Schelling calls ‘the power to hurt held in reserve’. On 27 October a Soviet missile shot down an American U-2 over Cuba, and the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, died; Washington chose not to respond at once with force. On 28 October Khrushchev announced on radio the withdrawal of the missiles.

What the chronology shows: a public deadline (the quarantine of 24 October), a cost to the sender (Kennedy had publicly staked his prestige) and an honourable exit for the adversary. It was later learned that there was also a non-public understanding on the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey, withdrawn in April 1963. They show what a successful compellence may require: a way out for both sides.

The lesson for the analyst: when you read a threat, ask what the adversary is asked to do (stop or refrain), whether there is a deadline, and what exit he is left.

For the forecaster: a reference class for crises with reciprocal threats exists and is documented: the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) database, which codes international crises from 1918 onward, with outcomes (agreement, stalemate, victory). A base rate is built on it by selecting crises with an explicit threat and counting in how many violence followed; the analyst takes the exact figure from the current version of the database, not from memory.

Indicators, with the source: official statements with a deadline and a condition (communiqués of governments, of NATO, of the UN Security Council); visible mobilisations and deployments (defence ministry reports and commercial satellite imagery published by research institutes); costly diplomatic moves (recalling ambassadors); missile tests (the CSIS Missile Threat database).

The typical trap: taking words as a signal. A harsh statement may be aimed at the domestic audience, not the adversary; what counts is what the sender has already done, not what he said he would do. A second trap: assuming maximum pressure leads to concession; a threat that is too large leaves the adversary only the option of conceding in public, often impossible.

Example scorable question: ‘Will North Korea carry out, between 1 January and 31 December 2027, at least one intercontinental ballistic missile test, according to the CSIS Missile Threat database consulted on 31 January 2028?’ It resolves yes/no from the database; if it is no longer updated, the list published by Japan’s Ministry of Defense is used, and if that does not exist either, the question is voided.

Why it matters On 28 October 1962, after 13 days of crisis, the Soviet missiles in Cuba were withdrawn, and the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey were removed in April 1963, as part of an understanding not public at the time.

Deterrence: donot beginCompellence: stop orundoCredibility: cost to thesender
The same threat, two different demands, one currency: credibility.

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