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Whoever controls a node through which the world's flows pass, from bank messaging to semiconductors, can see what circulates and cut others off: interdependence becomes an instrument of coercion.

Henry Farrell și Abraham L. Newman · Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion · 2019 · Henry Farrell și Abraham L. Newman, «Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion», International Security, vol. 44, nr. 1, 2019, pp. 42–79, rezumatul articolului (traducerea noastră)3 minutes read
“Increasingly, states are employing global economic networks to fulfill their strategic objectives.”Henry Farrell și Abraham L. Newman · Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion · 2019 · Henry Farrell și Abraham L. Newman, «Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion», International Security, vol. 44, nr. 1, 2019, pp. 42–79, rezumatul articolului (traducerea noastră)

Whoever controls the node through which flows pass can see everything that passes and cut anyone off, at the price of losing its own centrality.

In 1945, in National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Albert Hirschman showed that trade between a large country and a small one is not symmetric: the small one loses more if the relationship breaks, and the large partner can turn that asymmetry into influence. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman moved the idea from pairs of states to networks. In Weaponized Interdependence (International Security, 2019) they argue that the global economy has central nodes, such as bank messaging, dollar clearing or semiconductor production. The state with jurisdiction over a node gains two powers: the panopticon effect, meaning it can see the flows that pass through it, and the chokepoint effect, meaning it can cut an adversary off. The mechanism needs an asymmetric network, jurisdiction over the node and domestic institutions willing to act. SWIFT, a Belgian messaging cooperative, disconnected Iranian banks targeted by European Union sanctions in March 2012. In February 2022 Western governments immobilised part of the Bank of Russia's reserves, about 300 billion dollars by their own estimates, out of a total of roughly 630 billion. A node is not eternal: every use shows the target how costly it is to depend on it. The limits lie exactly there. Alternatives (local payment systems, settlement in other currencies, reserves held in gold) raise the cost for whoever uses the weapon, and a node used too often loses its centrality. For the forecaster, the useful question is not ‘will state X use the weapon?’ but who has jurisdiction over the node, how quickly the target can replace it and what the issuer loses if it does. Capacity and decision are different things.

Worked example: from network to numbers. Take the Bank of Russia's reserves first. At the start of 2022 they stood at about 630 billion dollars, a figure given in the Australian Parliamentary Library note of March 2022. Western governments immobilised, by their own estimates, about 300 billion: 300 / 630 ≈ 0.476, almost half. The rest, held in gold, in yuan or in accounts in jurisdictions that did not join the coalition, stayed accessible. The chokepoint effect was therefore partial, and it hit exactly the part held in the coalition's currencies and banks.

The second calculation is Hirschman's: concentration. For a hypothetical country whose exports are split among four partners in the proportions 60%, 25%, 10% and 5%, the sum of the squared shares is 0.36 + 0.0625 + 0.01 + 0.0025 = 0.435. If the same exports were split equally, 4 × 0.25² = 0.25, the minimum possible for four partners. The higher the index, the more credibly the dominant partner can threaten a rupture. The figure does not say whether the threat will be carried out, only how much it would cost the target to bear it.

The third step is the comparison between 2012 and 2022. The node was the same, SWIFT, and jurisdiction over it stayed the same; what changed was the size of the target and the available alternatives. In between, in 2015, the Chinese CIPS system appeared, a partial alternative for settlement in yuan. A forecaster who had only counted how many disconnections had occurred could not have deduced from 2012 what happens with a much larger economy; he had to ask what alternatives to the node existed and how much of the flows passed through them. The base rate says how often the weapon is used, the structure of the network says what it costs.

For the forecaster: the reference class has no standard count. It is built from sanctions databases (for example the Global Sanctions Database), keeping only financial measures: disconnections from payment systems, reserve freezes, restrictions on access to the dollar. Each row is counted once, on the date of the legal act, not of the political announcement. Without such a list, any ‘rate’ is only an impression.

Indicators to watch, with the public source of each. The share of currencies in allocated reserves: the IMF, COFER survey, quarterly. The share of the yuan in international payments: SWIFT's monthly renminbi report. The activity of alternative payment systems: CIPS reports. New sanctions acts: the Official Journal of the European Union and US Treasury releases.

The typical trap: confusing capacity with decision. That a state can cut a node says nothing about when it will do so, and the cost to the issuer rises with every alternative that matures. The second trap: treating an announcement as an act. A political statement disconnects no bank; the date of entry into force is what counts.

A scorable example question, illustrative: ‘Between 1 January and 31 December 2027, will SWIFT withdraw access from at least one bank in a country whose banks were connected on 1 January 2027, according to a SWIFT statement or an act published in the Official Journal of the EU?’ Resolution source: SWIFT statements and the Official Journal; the date that counts is that of entry into force; a later suspension does not change the outcome.

Why it matters The immobilisation of the Bank of Russia's reserves in 2022 showed that reserves held in other jurisdictions are not guaranteed, and the debate on where central banks keep their reserves was reopened.

Central networknodeJurisdictionover the nodePanopticon andchokepoint
Power comes from position in the network, not from the size of the economy taken alone.

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